0:00institutions are not quite running as smoothly as either we might like or we might fear. We have these weird things happening with Nvidia. If you look at prediction markets for what the anthropic IPO will go for, it's not flying above 2 trillion.
0:14Do you expect the growth to continue or do you think a leveling up?
0:17Benefits will exceed costs, but it will take some time and the path will be quite a bit more normal than many people would have you believe.
0:23What you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence. It's the ability of these agents to coordinate with one another. There's this idea of agentic swarms, but if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating. They're mostly just doing parallel processing.
0:39Often the faster that some things move, that just means you hit the real bottlenecks more quickly. If you ask me the question, when will agents be 10% of GDP? I don't think it's soon.
0:48What are the two different worlds look like? One in which GDP growth is a bit more normal and another in which it actually becomes double digit. Um, Alex Tyler, welcome to Th andZ podcast.
1:01Thanks. Thanks for having us.
1:02So, there's there's a lot to talk about. F. First, let's talk about some some timely topics. The media report came out. There's been a lot of conversation. Paul Cristiano has talked and tweets.
1:12there's a lot of sort of unrest and anxiety around sort of uh sort of the state of AI right now and and and RSI and and um I'm curious, Alex, what is your reaction to what we are seeing and and where do you stand on some of the proclamations being made right now?
1:28Um so I mean I I I read it closely. I think I think it's undeniable that we're having in you know incredible progress and that the progress is accelerating. I think anybody who's looking at, you know, the model releases, they're becoming, uh, you know, more frequent.
1:43Uh, they're becoming more powerful. The capabilities are, you know, going, you know, going from like last November to this November. It's just an unrecognizable world, especially with the, you know, the the difference between like Agentic AI and the chatbot era. um you're seeing like you know the what's coming out of companies when when you have data coming out on like the difference between you know the chatbot era versus the agentic era um you're seeing real productivity now like with the chatbot you're kind of like using it
2:13almost like a a fancy version of of a you know Wikipedia or something like that you're asking a questions it gives you gives you answers with an agentic system you're seeing actual work and that level of work the ability of these systems to actually do the work is just progressing so quickly and you know you're you're seeing a lot of hockey sticks basically. Um and that's what the meter report showed is that look here's another hockey stick. So to me I didn't
2:42I to tell you the truth I didn't update too much from the meter report because a lot of the data in the meter report has been around in other spaces. So the S1 statement um you know we knew about the some of the unreleased models. So it's uh I didn't update too much but that's because I was kind of already there. I is your view that the hockey sticks that you're identifying that they will just sort of continuously grow go up at what point might might they peter out or you know sort of how bullish are you from
3:11here on on some of these hockey sticks uh you know maintaining?
3:14So I mean like that's what you the the thing that you said some of these hockey sticks is I think the main term it's like where are the hockey sticks going to be? How are they connected? So in the meter report to me like the very the key phrase was unwellverified you know unwell specified tasks um what is the big question is like what about less specified tasks a lot of work is not well specified I I'm not one of those people who thinks this is like all right we're safe on the nonwell specified side
3:43I think the models are becoming increasingly better uh on on non very well specified tasks as well but I think you know it might be harder uh to to to do hockey sticks on those sort of tasks.
3:56Um there's also a lot of like the questions of like tacic knowledge uh kind of hayakian concerns about like the actual impact on the economy. I think you know Tyler and I are both economists. So all of all of this information I have to kind of sift through about what these hockey sticks mean for economics and what does it mean for economically valuable tasks. And the big questions for me are like every model iteration, what are the economically valuable tasks that is this model is unlocking that the previous
4:26model wasn't unlocking. And this is kind of captured very imperfectly by the hockey stick. So you can get a hockey stick that looks crazy on a benchmark and then you're not really seeing a lot of acceleration in the real world. We're not there yet. I think we're seeing a lot of acceleration in the real world. But these are just, you know, some of the questions that that that I have.
4:45Tyler, let's let's go to you. I feel like you've been a more sober voice uh in in the in the in the conversation.
4:51Alex hasn't been sober, but I just mean, do you have you updated at all based on what what's what's been happening here or what is your view?
4:57Well, often the faster that some things move, that just means you hit the real bottlenecks more quickly. So, I don't update that frequently, but this is AI land, and in AI land, the exact dates really matter. So, we're recording on November 11th, 2026. And that matters, I would say, since August, I've changed my views a fair amount. Most of all, because of the math problems. So, progress in areas where there are not many human bottlenecks. Uh, I see much
5:26more rapid progress and the ability to create a new model that is clearly better, say, within something like three weeks. Uh, I hadn't thought that would happen as quickly as it had. So I would date that to a few months ago. But if you mean over the last week, the mater
5:45bearish, we have these weird things happening with Nvidia. I have no prediction, but it will slow down the sector a bit. If you look at prediction markets for what the anthropic IPO will go for, they bounce up and down, but it's not flying above two trillion. You look at Anthropic's own projected revenue numbers. I forget the exact numbers. I wouldn't say I was underwhelmed, but they're not numbers that you would expect under the super fast takeoff scenarios. And that's for
6:15their IPO. So, I'd say I'm like 1% more bearish over the course of the last week than I was a week ago for those reasons. Just the institutions are not quite running as smoothly as either we might like or we might fear depending on your point of view.
6:33are either the sort of growth rates of open AI and anthropic um is your sort of base case that over the last let's say you know two or three years that those growth rates continue and and put aside the specific companies but I more mean just the the leading AI companies like the the the sort of economic impact that we've seen you know whether those two companies you know maintain the lead of course they're competing with the hyperscalers too do do you uh expect the the growth to to continue or do you think a leveling out?
7:03Well, I was in the Bay Area a few weeks ago and many people were pushing very high revenue numbers on me and I asked them all the following question. I said, "What are the other sectors that are going to grow sufficiently rapidly to justify the extreme revenue numbers you're giving me for anthropic and open AI?" And no one had an answer for that question. They didn't even try to give me answers. So, I think that means the extreme revenue numbers are false. That doesn't make me bearish on
7:32the sector as a whole. I'm still bullish. I think it will be fine. Those are great companies. But at the end of the day, you look at market data, whether it's real interest rates, stock prices, anything. Market data still look pretty normal. And the whole world investing community is talking about AI.
7:51It's not some kind of weird mystery like it was back in 2014 where you could say I read a less wrong blog post and now I'm really wealthy because I did. So I trust the judgment of the market more than the judgment of the Bay Area people who don't think that carefully about social interactions. So that's where I stand. It'll change the whole world. Uh benefits will exceed costs but it will take some time and the path will be quite a bit more normal than many people
8:18would have you believe. Yeah, and just to add to that, I think there Tyler is exactly spot on in the fact that like you need to start seeing the productivity numbers in the rest of the economy to justify the the revenue increases. So at some point the rest of the economy needs to be willing to pay for that for that product and that increasing willingness to pay has to be from increasing productivity in the rest of the economy. And we haven't really seen too much evidence of that. Not to
8:47say that it won't happen, but it does need to happen at some point. The other part about it is competition. So I think what's started to happen particularly in the last few months is extreme price competition um from from the frontier labs as far as like before they were just trying to compete on like who has the better model and now that the models are being used by increasing number of enterprises and uh they're becoming quite expensive because agentic AI by the way uses way
9:15more tokens um so now companies are you know open AI anthropic uh they're they're try you know muse is in the game. Uh Deep Mind is in the game trying to actually say like, "No, we're offering a cheaper model that that as good or maybe even like a little bit better or maybe a little bit worse." And so you're seeing token prices come down a lot. And so, you know, RAMP has a really nice data set of to track these things. And you saw exponential increases in token usage and flat
9:45revenue numbers, right? Where's that coming from? It's because of price price competition. So at the frontier, you're seeing way more price competition than you used to like six months ago.
9:54And the very recent elections, I think those are being overplayed. I think a lot of data centers still will proceed, but I think it will slow things down a bit. There's greater likelihood of regulation or somewhat tougher regulation or regulation a bit sooner or Trump, you know, giving on the issue of guard rails. To me, it's not a major force, but again, it's going to make me a modest bit more bearish on the sector in terms of speed of takeoff, revenue numbers, anything else.
10:23By the way, while we're on the topic, did the midterms cause you to update anywhere else, uh, Tyler, or it kind of, you know, thermostatic back uh, you know, backlash is is a thing and, you know, we should just expect these pendulum swings often.
10:34Well, most of it I expected and indeed predicted, but Texas truly surprised me. I didn't think Texas would flip the way it did. and maybe I just haven't been to the state enough lately, but that was a shock.
10:46Yeah. Yeah. So, AI in the economy, you you both talked about how, you know, you push back strongly against the idea of say, you know, double digit GDP growth at at some point due to your far more sober that hey, it will be tremendously impactful for uh for consumers. Um it it it will change a lot of things but uh GDP growth as you said you a few minutes ago it might be more normal than than we might expect. But before getting why that is
11:16can you explain what would need to be true for for or what are the two different worlds look like? one in which GDP growth is what we just said a bit more normal you know and another in which it actually becomes double digit and Alex you were alluding to it a little bit like paint that world to me of what it looks like if it's actually having you know massive impact on the economy there's a beautiful paper out there uh that outlines exactly the conditions you need for for for this like singularity type growth by uh by Ben Ben Jones Chad
11:46Jones I believe Aion is on that that paper as well and essentially what you need is a bunch of pretty knife edge conditions to to to be met. Particularly the main one is essentially no real bottlenecks. Um and the main bottleneck that should can't exist is the idea production function. So you can't get decreasing returns to ideas. So basically you go from like the old world where you have this technological
12:15breakthrough and then you kind of have decreasing returns to that technological breakthrough. from that technological breakthrough to start creating more and more technological breakthroughs. So you need less resources while getting more and more technology and more and more production out of that technology. And so you you basically have increasing returns rather than decreasing returns. And this is the the you can actually estimate this parameter in the model.
12:41And if it's greater than one, you're in this like double-digit growth world. If it's less than one, you're in the standard kind of like diminishing returns singledigit growth world. And if you look at the data so far, including kind of the meter report, the data that's out there, and you take that data and you estimate this parameter, it is decidedly less than one.
13:05So this could change and some people say it will change. And when you get the full RSI loop, this is exactly what that's going to change. But right now, you need increasingly more resources in order to ek out increasingly more intelligence out of these models.
13:22I would add to that, you can look at cases where growth has been very high.
13:26So, not long ago, Gana grew 40% in a year. That's crazy. But it's a tiny place selling one thing, oil. There's a brief period in the 80s where the US is growing over 8%. But that's coming out of a deep recession. after pandemics, after major wars, you can have temporarily high rates of growth. So if the US were to screw up in some way or we had another pandemic, some kind of terrible war, some other weird event, and that combined with a burst of
13:55AIdriven growth that might have given us 3 to 4%. Like could we for a year get to 10%, I'll say yes. I'd bet heavily against it and the effect would be temporary and a lot of it would come from getting out of the recession, war or pandemic. But that's another way to think about it fully consistent with what Alex was saying.
14:16And if robotics emerge, would that would you have a similar view or because that, you know, is is impacting more the the real world the real economy?
14:25Well, I think that would likely come relatively slowly. Look at how long it takes to get a Whimo in Washington DC. We're still not there. And that's a pretty simple kind of robot. There's like forwards, backwards, and turns. And if you look, well, what are the valuations of robotic companies at? Way higher than it had been. Hard to estimate, but you don't just see them popping into trillion dollar companies.
14:50I mean, you could count Tesla as a kind of robotics company, but the market data suggests, you know, it will happen. and it's making good progress but not going to give us 20% growth like three or four years from now. No.
15:03Right. Right. The and so the smartest people who are you know the biggest believers in in sort of this runaway growth uh you know Doresh Leopolds you know are our are friends on on who believe who believe that. What do you think they think differently? Is it that they um have a different belief on the speed of of technology? Is it that they uh believe that it will um sort of
15:32overcome some of these bottlenecks? Or would can we steal me on the other side?
15:37I I think and Tyler please chime in. I think I think the argument I'm going to get a bit technical here. Um it's about having something called homothetic or non-homothetic preferences. And basically there's a what that means is that if you look at kind of things that get automated in the past what ends up happening is the thing that gets automated contributes less to growth. So let's say you have a million robots let's bring robotics the thing that
16:06they're making because the price it becomes cheaper. The thing that they're making ironically becomes a smaller part of the economy and so they contribute less to growth. And so if you have non-homothetic preferences, which is this, you know, there was a really nice paper estimating this uh uh these preferences using, you know, 200 years of data. What ends up happening is that let's say you have broad automation.
16:30People just people the value in the economy of what contributes to growth moves to the bottlenecks. That's just an inconvenient part of how growth is measured. And so the thing that's growing least will be contributing most to GDP. And that's why you get these sort of effects.
16:45I agree with all that, but I would add a more sociological element. In my case, and I suspect Alex is, what is emotionally vivid in our minds is the long slog of human history, previous growth episodes, centuries of GDP data, productivity data. What I think is emotionally most salient probably for Dorcash Leopold and many others is conversations they have in the Bay Area which have real information. But when
17:14you ask the big question, you know, with which emotional salience will you make better predictions, I would opt for what Alex and I have stuffed our heads with over what they embibe all the time. But of course, you know, they would take the other side of that.
17:31So basically what we're saying is when you look at the last few hundred years the the breakthrough technologies from electricity to uh sort of you know the internet to you know uh everything in between they haven't led to runaway growth basically or if they did it was because of sort of a you know it was a small base or uh you know after a war or something like this. I do think this will likely be quicker than those but still you you have a sense of the bottlenecks whether it's the industrial revolution
18:00history of the scientific revolution implementation of electricity uh the IRS still uses fax fax machines and so on and so on try using edte software which I do all the time it's a nightmare they're not even up to you know how things should have been 10 years ago Yeah.
18:22And that's not that it's not regulation is not the problem. It's a problem, but just inertia is difficult to overcome. And so much of our economy, it's government, it's nonprofits, it can be highly regulated parts of the health care sector, higher red, general schooling.
18:40When you actually have experience with how those work, you could say like I don't know 40% of the US economy is a kind of nightmare. In Europe, it could be higher. like in France and I those sectors might need to be that way for other reasons but still it it's a big dose of realism that not everything is like startups.
19:01Yeah. Let's say you were both tasked by the the the president to come up with a set of metrics that determine whether AI is um you know leading to our country's flourishing you know broadly defined um obviously that's a very big question um but what is GDP one of the main metrics you would think about like should we be aspiring for it to have a a big impact on on GDP or what are some of the metrics you you would you would consider?
19:30Yeah, I mean, so this this is a really important question. So, I think the other thing that I would add before even starting is like I don't think Tyler and I really disagree with like the San Francisco consensus on like the capabilities. Like I think, you know, I I I don't this a lot of people hear Tyler and I or people like us talk and they're like, "Oh, you're bearish on AGI or something like that." That's absolutely not it. It's more about how that affects the economy and the
19:58structure of the real economy. And so thinking through like what measures we can be using, I think um GDP historically has been a really good tracker of uh of you know how basically human welfare and flourishing. It tracks pretty well with the gross gross uh gross domestic product. But the what Eric Byon, Avi Kohas and others have have been kind of studying is the fact that technology has actually started to
20:26introduce this sort of wedge where a lot of the products that technology creates are basically free. And so they they think about um the sort of like digital entertainment and digital products and then they have something called GDP which is um uh or GDP. I forgot the acronym. I'm sorry about that. Uh but it's essentially a you take GDP and then you amend it with a kind of a survey based measure to actually see how much
20:55other products that are not necessarily priced or products that have become cheap or even free uh because of automation how much the increased amount of those products is adding to human welfare because you could see a world where you're still kind of like in this four to you know 3 to 5% GDP range which is already on the high side of the growth But you you have a world that's actually truly flourishing. Like how do you pick that up? And I think the way to pick it up is through these alternative measures.
21:24The longevity effects could well prove important. So Eric, say you live to 120.
21:30I don't think I'm going to make it. Uh that will in complicated ways boost GDP and even more complicated ways possibly boost per capita GDP. But it is something distinct from GDP that you get all those extra years and economics can value those years and that's another way in which it may become more important to revise GDP. But I you know as Alex said GDP will become somewhat less accurate over time as AI progresses and we'll
21:58need to revise and improve it. But in the short run it's just not that bad a measure. I like to say GDP the most underrated stat statistic that there is.
22:11Yeah. In in the in the 2010s, Peter Thiel, you know, famously uh decrieded sort of the lack of progress in atoms relative to to bits. Um but here we are, you know, 10 years, 15 years later, and we've got uh you know, self-driving cars. We've, you know, early flying cars. Uh we we've got, you know, major, you know, uh you know, the biggest companies are now hardware companies. Uh you know, Nvidia, uh SpaceX, Tesla.
22:38Tyler, would you go so far as to say that um you know that that isn't a concern as much anymore? Or how would you reflect on that 10 years later?
22:47The atoms will break through. I would say almost for sure, but we still don't have them. Like the contribution of driverless cars to actual human welfare is tiny. Like the biggest contribution is that it's fun and you can tell your friends I was in a Whimo. It's not really better than an Uber. For me, it's a little worse because they go by the speed limit. It's fun in a science fiction kind of way. Most of America still doesn't have it. Europe, forget
23:15about it. So, we're still not there. That's the amazing thing. And it gets back to robotics also will be slow.
23:22Yeah. I think I asked you 10 years ago, when would the great stagnation be over?
23:26And I I think you said something along along the lines of when we have self-driving cars, I can't remember if it was deployed or you know, you know how sort of diffused it was, but you still believe that?
23:37More or less. But that's a matter of degree and they clearly work and the new Tesla is pretty phenomenal. I've been in Alex Stabberox lately a few times, but in terms of market penetration, I don't know the numbers, but again, it's tiny.
23:51Let's go back to a different topic. Uh, Alex recently wrote wrote a related paper about, but I'll start with you, Tyler. The agent swarm uh topic, sort of the hugging face incident. Did that update your views in terms of what's what's possible or make you uh get concerned about something or or any any reactions to what happened there?
24:11It didn't update my views much at all.
24:13And I'm curious to see if Alex agrees with this perspective. But as an economist, you think first and foremost in terms of principal agent theory and unless the conditions are very restrictive. The principal just can't control the agent that well no matter what contract they try to write. So when we replicate that result with AIS, well, it's interesting, but I'm not very shocked. The answer was always going to be checks and balances and what we might call separation of powers in the
24:42political realm. Not you have perfect alignment. So again, if you come at this from the economist's point of view, all the hand ringing about alignment, like yes, people should work on that a lot, but at the end of the day, you're like, "Hey, I learned that when I was 17."
24:57Like, okay, it's a real problem. But Alex, what's your thought on that?
25:02I unfortunately did not learn that when I was 17. Um, I think we once again agree. Um I think you know there's like these s sort of different perspectives on this issue of um how do you best ultimately it's a question about like how do you best get AI to be in the service of humanity right that's that's the question that's the question of alignment and one kind of way of thinking about it is to get the models themselves aligned with like something
25:32like a constitution that the models at an individual level are aligned in this way because they have the same preferences as the human beings that are that are deploying them. Um, but another perspective which is what Tyler mentioned is like you align things. You don't you don't almost like don't even care what the preferences of these agents are. They could be extremely individually misaligned but you can create a mechanism around them where the incentives are such that the agent behaves in an aligned way. And this is the mechanism design perspective in
26:01economics where like as a principle I don't need the agent to to want to help me necessarily the agent could really really want to just help themselves and do whatever they want. And the whole study of mechanism design is how do you create the system of checks and balances in order for the agent to still be working in the principal's a interest.
26:21And I think that's that is I from the research that I've been seeing coming out of of the labs both like internally externally like a lot of people are thinking in this direction that we really need to take a mechanism design perspective and as Tyler said like I wasn't you know shocked by what happened.
26:40I'm not aligned with the governor of Virginia but it's a pretty well-run state and I'm happy here. Mhm.
26:47We have two party competition sort of and it works.
26:53Do you think the way that Anthropic or Open AI or some of these companies or just the sort of AI safety community thinks about alignment, do you think that is sort of not the right way to think about it or or confused in some sense?
27:04Well, there's how they think about it and how they talk about it. And how they talk about it is way too shaped by Twitter, which can be quite hysterical. How they actually think about it, I believe, is a lot more reasonable than how it ever looks from the outside. So, I don't have some big speech about, oh, we've got to totally reform them. I think they're pretty practical. They're companies. They have IPOs coming up.
27:26They don't want to get sued too much. They don't want to be overregulated. We already have checks and balances. Not all of them good to be clear.
27:33Uh but the reality is the actual problems we've seen, you know, the hacks, they're mostly coming or maybe entirely coming from evil human individuals where the AIs are doing what the humans told it to do and that is a huge problem. Uh but that is a kind of well we have the alignment the evil human says do this and the AI does this and that's where the costs are coming from.
27:59Yes. Some people make the comparison that alignment is in some ways is for the employees. It's sort of like um or safety in general is like in the in 2020 2021 and and sort of around that time there was you know sort of more awareness around social issues and so CEOs had to sort of say these uh say these things to please their employee base and um you know some of them were true believers and some of them weren't and and similarly perhaps around AI safety there's a lot of concern and so some people are making that uh that
28:28comparison that that the CEOs aren't as true believers as as they may be uh indicating there's checks and balances in these companies as well. It's partly why the companies work well that you have to actually end up pushing through things that will work and that's somewhat different than what everyone is saying and there's a winnowing and selection set of mechanisms within the company and people want promotions or bonuses and they want to do things that can work and uh again it will end up going better than how it will sound on Twitter I
28:59Yeah. And I think like hugging face is like a perfect example of like if you unpack like what what actually happened, it's just a bunch of human error on top of human error, right? And so like it's great to have an incident. I mean great in quotes, but it it didn't like cause a massive disaster, right? And it exposed a lot of like you know uh broken incentives for the agents. So it's it was you know you see how you know the the companies have reacted to the hugging face by learning from it and
29:28creating better environments and so this is nothing is smooth. It'll be kind of a little bit down a little bit up but you know the slope is positive.
29:37The uh I mean some people you know Paul Cristiano I think said in his speech he's like the most likely cause of death you know a year from now or two years from now will be an AI related death. Um and that that to you sounds sort of you know historical. strong disagree.
29:52Yeah. Yeah. Um Alex, let's go deeper on on your paper. Why don't you share some of the the findings that you that you had and some of the questions that that still remain.
30:04Yeah. So, like the the the paper I believe are you're talking about the uh uh organizing intelligence paper. Yeah.
30:10With with Andrew Co and my my my uh colleague Shane Le. Um and basically the the idea of that paper is that it starts with this kind of puzzle that you know AI is becoming very capable on particular dimensions but we don't see still see any like visible economic transformation and the first kind of thing that we start with is that there's been this focus on individual agent benchmarks without kind of thinking about what those agents are actually competing with in the economy where the
30:39thing that's the competitive the relevant competitive unit is not the agent it's the organization. And the organization in uh historically has been referred to as a form of super intelligence because of this concept called Ricardian comparative advantage.
30:53So basically if you have a bunch of jobs the person who does the job is not the average person, it's the person who's best suited for it. So like the envelope of the intelligence in an organization is way better than if you kind of average across the population. And so these the AI agents are basically competing against forms of human organizations or teams of humans. And so you shouldn't compare a ben individual level benchmark to how well a human does something. It should be across the
31:21entire kind of uh what we call mosaic intelligence. So the thing that we so then we kind of start layering on like what sort of how do capability improvements will actually affect the economy and equilibrium. So this is a formal theoretical paper and we look at different levels of intelligence. So we start with minimal AGI where the AI models are as good as average human capability on every single dimension. So minimal AGI and we show that even when
31:50you get to this point you're not going to have a huge impact on the economy uh because again because the organizations are not the average human ability.
31:59They're better than that. And so what you're going to start seeing is actually wages change uh because you know production becomes cheaper and so that's going to affect human wages. And so what we show is that what you actually need for real economic transformation is not just competence like ability on particular tasks to to change. It's the ability of these agents to coordinate with one another. If you look at hugging face and even like how the the solutions
32:27to the millennium stro uh millennium problems, there's this idea of agentic swarms, right? But if you unpack it, these agents are still very bad at coordinating. They're not coordinating.
32:39They're just do they're mostly just doing parallel processing. And if you have benchmarks specifically on coordination, you could actually show that one agent does better than two agents splitting the work even if they can communicate. Whereas if you give the same thing to a per two people, they actually divi they uh have division of labor. They communicate and they do way better than one person with double the resources. So the agents are still pretty bad at coordinating. But if they get better at coordinating, you can
33:08basically break the coian ceiling on firm size and you can get very very different firms to emerge. So that's the basic premise is that coord once coordination becomes better you the economic space of possibilities of what firms look like what happens to wages what happens to employment that's when the real kind of visible changes that are going to happen and and what's the biggest bottleneck to figuring out coordination at the moment
33:35to be honest I don't know um I I I I think it could be as simple as that it's not being trained into the models it's it's not part of post training I I actually don't have any insight on that.
33:46Yeah, we we've talked about some areas where you agree. I'm trying to find some areas where there's some difference of opinion. May maybe let's try employment.
33:55Um Alex, I I think you're you're more worried about sort of the transition happening so fast that there might be some something sudden happen on the employment side or when do you share your your your concerns or views? Um, I'm basically worried about the potential and again like I actually agree quite a bit with Tyler that things things are potentially going to move pretty slowly um as far as like the effect on the real economy but if there is a fast transition like let's say
34:23there's a breakthrough in coordination what we show in that paper is that if there's a breakthrough in coordination there is the potential for wages and employment to suddenly there's like a phase transition as far as what will happen to the economy in that case there still will be new sectors and new potential opportunities but the sort of rematching that we have in the economy that you know because of transitions to take used to take quite a long time the
34:52sort of rematching doesn't have a opportunity to happen. So you have these large larger pools of unemployment and that leads to kind of these recursive loops where people kind of get scarred out of the labor market. So that's my my personal worry, but you know, as far as that's that's a scenario that I'm worried about. Likelihood is is kind of a different story.
35:12I have a related worry. It's it's close to the same thing, I think, but it's just hard to tell right now if you're hiring someone. Will the person be good at AI?
35:21The skills they used to need, we had imperfect indicators. Oh, they went to Cornell or they got all A's or they had a good interview. And now the skill will they be mentally flexible enough to pick up AI you know we don't know often so that could increase the natural rate of unemployment match good matches will be harder search will take longer I don't think that problem will be with us forever eventually the AIs themselves will figure it out and there'll be
35:50certifications for how good a person is in AI but in the transition everyone's a novice you might be like well established the way a lot of people in in the tech world are, but otherwise we're all noviceses at this very important new skill.
36:08And so I guess what does that that mean for and I guess I'm curious how you think about sort of employment wages sort of yeah these questions well some additional slowness in hiring people but there'll be an incredible number of new projects uh new jobs so I I'm pretty bullish actually and labor markets have been fine so but of course there'll be disruptions and transition problems as there always are as there were with the China shock the industrial rev evolution. So, I
36:38expect a new set of those. A bunch of them we haven't even figured out or seen yet, but they'll come. Absolutely. To what extent will there be just sort of an explosion of agents sort of buying transacting with other agents in this kind of like almost parallel economy and you know there's so many more of them.
36:58They're 24/7. and they can like h how to the extent that you know agents become the dominant sort of impact uh or sort of force on the internet and like what is the right mental model of thinking about what that will look like or what that won't look like.
37:12I don't know what you mean by the word explosion. If you ask me the question when will agents be 10% of GDP? I don't think it's soon. Now if they rose from basically 0ero to 6% you could call that an explosion. 6% of GDP is enormous. Even that doesn't seem that soon. If it's like one and a half percent, I could see that I don't know within five years. Just if you're going to force me to give guesses, you could call one and a half% an explosion. GDP is huge. That's one of the core insights
37:42of economics. GDP is huge. It's huge.
37:46Yeah. And I mean like even with the agents that we have now, they're they're they're already incredibly capable like the the the sort of consumer grade things that live on your phone. But you know that that's the thing like there's just completely unintuitive bottlenecks out there like the websites are designed for human beings and they're all different. And so you know you're still getting into issues with where your super smart agent is like booking you a flight booking you a seat right next to
38:14the toilet every single time. Every single time. And then you're like I don't want to use an agent next time.
38:20Or the fact that there's all of this regulation out there. I mean that's the big one, right? So like agents, companies are spending billions of dollars trying to do basic choice architecture on their website in order to upsell humans on products, right?
38:34They don't want to agents don't have the same psychology and so they're not going to be prone to these sort this sort of choice architecture. So these platforms have an incentive not to allow, you know, somebody else's agent to go in and shop for them. And you're already kind of seeing it. So like if you pull up Muse or something like that, it can't shop on Amazon for you. Um, I don't use agents to manage my calendar, although they could because I want to know mentally in my mind what's coming each day. And the only way I can
39:03remember is if I have to write it down in extra time on my calendar. And that's stupid. That's my flaw. But I don't think it's going away. And the agents could be 10 times better, whatever that means. And I'm still going to want to write it on my calendar. So I think, oh, December 18th, I'm seeing a Renaissance music concert. And I know that off the top of my head. So there are these funny indivisibilities and how we allocate our attention but are often some of the biggest bottlenecks.
39:32Going back to the regul regulation part um t you seem more sober that this sort of uh the midterms um you know might not lead to uh sort of uh you know data centers stalling indefinitely. I'm curious just for your broader thoughts on AI sentiment. how much of the uh negativity is real in the sense that it will lead to you know we saw like Bloomington you know trying to outlaw usage of it as well to some degree like what are your thoughts here on on sort of what's uh how you should think about
40:01the political economy of that well we have 50 states there's counties there's cities there's even other countries it seems it will slow down a bit but still basically go through even the te the new Texas governor is already backtracking like, well, we just want the labor unions involved. They need to pay good wages. You know, the projects we have now will go ahead. The others we're going to look at again, Josh Shapiro, the rhetoric was very strong. The reality is quite different. So, it
40:30raises costs, but I don't think ultimately it will matter that much. But will there be a bunch of places that absolutely say no? Probably. But again, 50 states, I'm glad we have them. Uh maybe you'll end up with 52.
40:48Yeah. And I mean um just to piggyback on that, I think like it just completely depends on the path, right? So it's like things everything's kind of indogenous including political economy. So you know the reason that the governors are backtracking this because like unemployment look great rate looks great. The economy is growing at a reasonable amount. Everything kind of looks fine economically. So like there's no like instrumental reason for there to be this sort of political economy
41:15reaction. But the thing that I think people who are projecting these very extreme scenarios don't realize is that with a the beginning of an extreme scenario there will be the beginning of an extreme political economy reaction and that will kind of endogenously constrain things. So, it's just going to be a back and forth. And what the data will end up looking like to our an to, you know, people living in the future is that things moved a lot slower than people would think because of this sort
41:46It it seems like, you know, uh the the sort of amount of money one can put in politics, you know, everyone was worried about Citizens United a long time ago and, you know, corporations gonna control everything, but, you know, Elon put in 500 million or what whatever it was and couldn't get the out outcome he wanted. Is is this a sort of um expose the limitations of of money in politics or is it just that you know tech people or not just tech people corporations may be very good at allocating for their
42:13business but maybe not you know uh that great at allocating in in sort of uh the DC and political realm.
42:21Dare I say that academia is slightly underrated by Bay Area people. People who study campaign finance have known this for a long time. There's a lot of evidence that spending doesn't matter that much. You can think that's good or bad, but none of this surprised me in the slightest. And I don't think it's that the people are fools. Uh you might think they're fools in some broader sense of just having political aspirations at all. But there's just apart from some number of local races,
42:50there's no simple way to just spend a lot of money and get the politics you want. It's checks and balances. even though no one in the system is like aligned with you.
43:01Yeah, it's a beautiful system we have. I'm like just every day I'm in I'm I'm not joking. I'm like it's you know the the American system is incredible and competitive markets are incredible. It's just everything just, you know, it's it's not perfect, but exactly as Tyler said, like there's all this magic that comes out of the system.
43:22Yeah. I'm I'm I'm curious if you were both interviewing each other, what what you would uh what you would what are you most curious about. Tyler, I'll I'll start with you. Where are you most curious about Alex's perspective on on on something or or or Yeah.
43:36Well, your origin story of how you became an economist.
43:42Well, it's that's a very self-serving question, Tyler, because it has to do with you.
43:48Okay, we'll say more.
43:50Yeah. So I mean so I was uh I'm an immigrant from Muldova. So you know I very you know grew up on food stamps and things like that in America. And I my parents didn't know anything about economics. I didn't know anything about economics. I I went to college and I was premed cuz I knew what a doctor was. Uh my parents knew what a doctor was. And in college like you had to take like prerequisites and I took an econ one class and I thought this was kind of
44:18fun. But I'm still premed and I took it. I got good grades, made made my GPA higher than my premed classes suggested.
44:26Um, and then, you know, I was going to go to medical school. I applied to medical school. I got into medical school and then, you know, I started reading Marginal Revolution and I started listening to uh, you know, that I I also heard like an NPR article uh, uh, program with Richard Thaylor. And between the both of you guys, it was just, oh, I can do this with economics.
44:51I only knew one part of that story, so thank you.
44:54I knew the marginal revolution part.
44:56Yeah. No, I mean it was but it was like because you at that point, this was 2008 or n um there weren't a lot of these economists like you know actually showing you how much you can do with the topic. And so I actually, you know, I pulled out of medical school of the of the process. I went to the only school that accepted me which was you know thank you UC San Diego. Um and uh yeah the rest is history. I I this is just
45:23like the such an incredible field and knowledge base to kind of understand to the extent that we can which is like not very high about uh about what's going on in this you know complex system that we call the economy.
45:36Can I ask a followup please?
45:38Will and should Muldova become a part of Romania?
45:46I mean my Yes. That's my view.
45:50And they will. I figure they should, but they will.
45:54Yeah. I I They were originally. I mean, it was the country was called Basarabia. My grandma, you know, she was from Basarabia.
46:00She wasn't from Muldova. Um, and it I think it this probably a controversial opinion, but I I I'm actually not from Muldova. I'm from Transnistra. Ah, okay. Now it's all clear.
46:13So, yeah. So, like you know that we were refugees from Transnistria to America. So, there was a civil war. We were like in basement hiding from bullets and all that type of stuff. And then we we ended up coming to America as refugees. But I think it's like, you know, the c the if you know Muldoven culture, it's very similar to Romanian culture. Um the language is almost the same.
46:35When the VCs say always ask for the origin story, they're so correct.
46:41Yeah. The um Alex, what question would you ask Tyler?
46:46Um I I want to know your because you were so early on this and I don't think I've ever heard this story of like how how were you kind of attracted to AI and thinking about AI so seriously. Um, and you were you were very early about like the transformative potential of the technology like uh and I'm just curious like how how how did you how did you realize that earlier than most?
47:10Well, all chess players have a story like this. I was in early years at like a chess prodigy. So I was age 13 playing in New Jersey and they wheeled in a computer called Tinkerbell that played against the humans and it sucked but I saw what the progress was like. But the point about chess players is this. They all know if they're any good. The chess is not like pocket calculator stuff.
47:36And if you see computers conquer an area that you already knew was mostly intuition, you will find it very easy to believe they can conquer a bunch of other areas. So Kasparov was early to this. Ken Rogoff didn't need much AI pilling. He was early to this. And the chess people were the first ones there. And that's a very simple direct story. And that's how it happened.
48:00Demis 2. Absolutely common stories. You see it, you know, kick butt by the 1990s and it beats Kasparov of Deep Blue. And Deep Blue is not a great model.
48:10But it's like, okay, uh, it can do this.
48:13So, you're just waiting for it to spread to everything else. But it took a long time. In fact, yeah. I I think this is like a great example of like you know a lot of people would have looked at AI and said hey this it can't do this it can't do that but it's it it that it's going to be able to do almost everything because you know like thinking about like RLVR or something like that like the verifiable reward part of of post training a lot of people like use that as like copium like
48:43oh that's not verifiable that's not verifiable but like if you train the verifier almost anything will become verifiable.
48:50The fact that you can criticize it means it's verifiable almost, right?
48:54Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. So, it's like it's it's a and and chess is like a really great example. Like you see if you're a really good chess player, you know exactly how much that that intuition is required and how far that's going to go in the future.
49:08Mar is working on the poets. I'm not sure how far along they are. Uh but it seems to me it should work.
49:16Mhm. in better poetry, right? To write great poetry. I think uh in less than two years, it will be possible if people put their minds to it at all. I don't mean a big major effort with billions, but just some kind of effort at all. Bring in a dozen poets, pay them something, right? Doesn't have to be that much. Let them loose, have some checks and balances on the process.
49:40Yeah. Some people at the firm think that the idea of of taste being uniquely human is is a cope. that uh that that the systems will are already good at.
49:50They already have great taste. You ask them about classical music like what's the best recording of Sibilius's fifth whatever they give great answers better than the Penguin Guide right now.
50:01Yeah. Fascinating. Okay. So, there's a few grab bag questions I want to ask before before we wrap. one is did you guys see Doresh's uh sort of essay he collaborated with somebody on sort of basically saying that Pikid you know wasn't right about the last century but but his model of you know RG etc is is might be right in the AI uh century I'm I'm curious if you uh had a take on that Alex yeah so this is with Phil Trel I think
50:28um capital in the 21st century y um I think that's a that's I think it's uh the the idea a that economic activity may be divorced from labor and be kind of focused on on capital. Um that the that's kind of the broader idea of the piece. I think I think many people took took kind of uh uh had issues with the actual methodology of the piece which you know I won't I won't speak to but
50:57the broad idea of the technology potentially increasing this concentr that the the reliance on capital I think that is a that is a scenario that could happen um but there's alternative scenarios and this is things that I've written about and I think Tyler also alluded to this where um depending on there's there's an alternative scenario where like you know there's just more jobs created and these jobs are valuable because of the fact that they're scarce.
51:26Right. So the idea is that you know value moves towards scarcity. These this is kind of like the whole bottleneck logic and then if those jobs are in a rich society they there will be a lot of value going to those jobs. And it's just a question of how many of those jobs exist and whether it can support the entire economy. And historically that's been the case, but that's been that's the real big question mark. Um, but these are things that we just need to watch for with data. So like my paper
51:56with you know an economic policy for AGI just basically makes that argument. We need to be tracking where where the economy is going with AI in a much more uh comprehensive way.
52:07Very fundamental technologies tend to benefit the consumers. Fire, language, electricity and so on and so on. That's no proof it will happen again. But we need to distinguish between capital can do a lot versus there are entry barriers that will acrue monopoly rents to particular capital owners.
52:27And I don't see that that piece really made a strong case for the latter proposition. It was mainly arguing capital can do a lot. But if the capital is commoditized like I know people who say all the rents will go to land, all the rents will go to energy. I'm not sure that's true, but those seem more likely than all the rents go to capital if you had to say.
52:50Yeah, that that's right. It goes to scarcity. And if scarcity is is energy, that's where the rents will go.
52:57Now, maybe AI itself makes energy less scarce. So that's why I'm reluctant to predict, but I at least see the case to think, well, the the Gulf countries will make out like bandits and so on or the land owners, but AI will change enough things. Say we can terraform land quite cheaply and desalinate water very cheaply. It doesn't seem so implausible.
53:20Well, maybe it's location of land or the best retirement spots or like Tahoe is so special because you're near the Bay Area but you don't pay the taxes or but it's very hard to predict but think through scarcity most of all.
53:34Yeah. And in in our world on that on that note we we think that the biggest scarcity is is on supply and in the short term uh that that demand is is much bigger than uh than it seems. Uh but that rests on the sort of assumption or or sort of the belief that when you talk to the super users, they sort of like can't get enough. Um and there's the the super users are really a small percentage of of of people at at at a small percentage of companies and AI is
54:01still not broadly diffused yet. And I think the counter to that claim would be well it's not having measurable impact on companies yet. So it is uh sort of speculative that um you know the more that AI is used it will eventually lead to impact on these companies in ways that justify uh the massive increase in spend. Um but you know we just started a new fund actually called machine age fund which is you know doing data centers and other elements of the sort
54:28of infrastructure stack to be able to um mitigate some of these supply challenges. Leopold's paper situational awareness does does that sort of stand to you as like one of the more important uh sort of you know public intellectual pieces in technology in the in the past few years or I'm curious what you think of the the legacy of uh of that in anything not just technology but that said I think he's too enamored of fast takeoff as I told him at the time he's
54:58assuming simulation can substitute for experiment and thus you get this neverending loop where science just keeps on accelerating and I don't think simulation very much subs in for experiment. It will in some areas.
55:14I think you know I'm I'm too Lucas critique pill uh for sorry another another inside baseball but it's like basically why you need to understand kind of like the deep structural parameters of the problem in order to actually be able to predict. what simulations do and what AI is really good at is predicting, but it's uh it doesn't take the indogenous response of the system a lot of the time into account. And um we'll we'll we'll see
55:42that kind of play out more and more. I think the um Robin Hansen's Age of M how do you think that uh that stands up or will the legacy of of those ideas be?
55:52Well, I think it's wrong. It's a brilliant book and I love Robin but when it came out which is now a while ago I said Robin AI is going to get there first and Robin says no AI might get there but M has to come first and I said Robin M probably will never happen but if it does first it needs AI and I think my side of that debate is looking very good but it's a great book to read for getting ideas and just shaking you out of you know the dogmatic slumbers. Do you have any We're right now talking of
56:19speaking of timely issues sort of Nvidia is sort of is in a big uh crosshairs at the moment uh with sort of the Jensen situation as you sort of view the public discourse. what do you think is misunderstood or or how are you sort of interpreting um you know what this potentially means or what lessons if any to to take or what do you think Tyler you know we've already said alignment is impossible the stakes were so high his behavior the company something seems out of alignment
56:49in fact it will be fine because of checks and balances I don't know how they're going to operate uh I think it's a great lesson in all the different things we've been saying Alice anything you'd add yeah I I think um you know I'm I I I I think this is not really going to change the trajectory much. I think like checks and balances work. We have diversity in the supply chain to to a large extent.
57:14Um everything is over subscribed. Demand creates supply. Supply creates demand.
57:20Um so I think I think things are going to uh you know the the the system is robust. The biggest change might be if something goes wrong at the macro level and Nvidia had to step in as a buyer or lender of last resort with a weakened or gone CEO founder type. They're a lot less able to do that than they would have been had all this never happened.
57:43Like, yeah, that matters, but in the medium term, it's going to wash out and it could slow things down a bit. But again, the structural forces will take over sooner or later. Mhm.
57:55If you if you had to expect what is the next genre of sort of situational awareness like document that is going to be remarkably preient and greatly impact our society, where would you expect that that to be? Would it be in something in biotech? Would would still be in something in AI? Like how how are you thinking about sort of what are some underrated ideas right now that might be massive in the years to go?
58:18Well, they're underrated to me, too. I mean, everyone talks about biotech and I'm fully on board, but I think that will be especially slow because of regulation and the inability to use simulation to address the main issues.
58:33But again, Eric, I think you'll live to 120 and I think I will not. That's a simple way to put it. I I think we're going to get better models of a to the extent that AI will create better models of micro and macro phenomenon like better structural models. So something like the model of the cell or like an like a act like using digital twins to do macroeconomics or something like that to the extent that you are going to be able to put structure on things that we
59:02need to be able to use to predict that's going to be the real big blow up I think. Um, and because that kind of gets to that idea in economics like the reduced form versus structural debate where you when you understand the structure, you can really create brand new things. And I think AI the potential for AI to do that to help you understand and recreate that structure. I think that's really underrated.
59:28It'll be great. Ross Jetty has a new paper out on digital twins.
59:31Exactly. Digital twins. That's exactly what I'm referencing. But he needed, you know, five co-authors and a lot of money and a research center, which is fine. It's wonderful that he's done it. But that also goes to show you something.
59:44Let let's close on the university question actually because we we we said earlier, you know, the the the academy is underrated in in some ways, certainly by Silicon Valley. Now that we've, you know, given the the the props, I do want to ask you guys, where are you most excited um in terms of innovation uh uh in in higher education? and uh where is the the most sort of urgent need? We of course are interested in the question having incubated Harwitz and Dre Academy. Um maybe Tyler, we'll start with you.
1:00:12I hope you all do something and spend more money on it than what you've announced and put some of your best people on it. Uh I don't really know what your plans are. Uh but I'd love to be involved in some way. And as with you Austin and uh Manurva and other innovations, we need much more experimentation, innovation, and measurement in higher ed. And if you're part of that, I'm thrilled.
1:00:35Amazing. I would love to have you. Alex, where are you most excited or uh what what advice might might you have to anybody trying to innovate in higher education?
1:00:43I think more innovation the better. I think higher ed's going to change drastically in the next I don't know. I I don't have a great timeline for it just because they're such uh slowmoving institutions. Um and uh but I think it's going to we're we're the forces of of the market forces are going to lead to a shrinking of the kind of our standard idea of higher ed of what that sector looks like the traditional version. Uh but I think we're going to have a ton of
1:01:11new innovation and um we're going to have I I'm very bullish in higher ed in the long term. That's that's what I'll say. And are you both bullish on the field of e economics at the moment? Are you encouraged by what what's happening right now? Um where do you where do you stand there?
1:01:26I mean I think the the economic toolkit and the economic way of thinking is extremely underrated. So I'm extremely biased too. But I think like the way that I that I I see things play out like you know we had the earlier question about you know alignment and um the economic toolkit is like is perfect for thinking about that through this mechanism design perspective and you have this type of thing going on all the time about like endogenity in the political economy question and thinking through these sorts of consequences
1:01:54thinking through the Lucas critique about like you know you estimate a parameter but that's actually not a structural parameter so it's not going to be valid to actually use that parameter in order to actually make the decisions. So all of these sorts of things are super important and they're going to be more important in the coming days, I think. So I'm I'm I'm I'm bullish and it may just become social science.
1:02:14So the thing the things economists don't know, the AI fills in for the basic metal toolkit becomes more valuable. This is originally a Chicago idea from Gary Becker and others.
1:02:26And uh you just want really smart people who have some skills a bit like those that we now call software engineers, but it will have its own name. And they have their fingers on the dials and they manage a bunch of AI agents and they're emparios and they know economics and do all of social science. That's what I expect. So a true realization of the earlier Chicago vision.
1:02:49I'm from the University of Chicago, so I I I I buy that vision. I'm happy with that vision. We maybe we'll do it at the University of Chicago.
1:02:56Amazing full circle uh moment to end the conversation. Uh Tyler, Alex, thank you so much for coming to the podcast.
1:03:02Thank you. My pleasure.