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Sequoia shrinks to its core
Sequoia published a restructuring plan:
- Programs cut: it is sunsetting its Arc batch accelerator and its Scouts program, and simplifying the Sequoia Capital Fund .
- One team: Early and Growth are no longer separate. "There is only Sequoia" .
- London: the office is closing and several people are leaving. Sequoia says it still expects Europe to produce outlier founders and will support them from the Bay Area .
- Partnership: it describes changes that flatten the partnership. It also reports raising about $10B in new funds .
Newcomer, citing unnamed sources, reports that at least three US-based partners were forced out as part of the overhaul .
Luciana Lixandru, who led the London team, will stay in Europe. She remains a Sequoia partner, keeps her board seats, and plans to invest personally in European founders . She listed early-stage work with Pennylane, STARK, Profound, Rillet, Trade Republic and others .
Reactions split. Nathan Benaich called it "europe in managed decline" . Martin Casado called it "a lot of really smart moves" .
What it means for investors: the most prominent firm in the business is dropping its accelerator, scout program and European office to concentrate capital on fewer, higher-conviction bets. That leaves room at the pre-seed stage and in Europe for other investors.
Where AI money comes from, and how concentrated it is
Menlo Ventures (enterprise survey). Menlo's fourth annual report estimates enterprise AI deployment spend at $176.8B in 2026, up 5.4x from $33B. That is about 30% of public-cloud revenue . The survey covered about 400 enterprise decision-makers. Their new AI spending came from:
- 55% net-new budgets
- 22% software budgets
- the rest from labor and other budgets
Of the 22% taken from software budgets, incumbents got 13 points and AI-native vendors got 9 points ($12.6B) .
Incumbents win where they already own the workflow. ServiceNow has 91% of AI spend in IT and Workday has 68% in HR. In customer success, AI-native Sierra and Decagon lead the fastest-growing category, at 4.3x .
Coding is a $34B category. Claude Code and Codex take $24B of it, or 70%. Independent coding apps total $10.1B, up 2.9x . For screening, this means thin layers on top of a frontier model compete directly with the model's maker. Startups have better odds where the customer pays from labor or new budgets than from software seats.
Ramp (business card transactions). Ramp's data shows the risk that comes with that concentration. The top 1% of firms spent $9,568 per employee per month on AI in September, down 3.1% from a July peak. Over the same period, the top 10% and the median firm kept rising . Those top-1% firms account for 80% of OpenAI and Anthropic spend, and spend about 600x what the median firm does .
Ramp's lead economist attributes the stall mainly to falling model prices, such as Opus 5.5 cutting cost per task by about 40% . SaaStr reads Anthropic's still-blank October 31 run rate this way:
- above about $75B would mean heavy users came back
- about $68–70B would mean they have plateaued
Two other views:
- Casado, passing on a point from Vitaly Gordon, notes that tokens are still under 5% of labor cost at most companies, which argues against assuming spending has saturated .
- Newcomer's sources, investors who have backed both labs, see Anthropic pulling away from OpenAI. One described "infinite demand" from long-term investors and expects the IPO before Thanksgiving . That is investor sentiment, not confirmed timing.
Open-weight inference is becoming its own business
Cohere is now following Mistral in offering "sovereign inference": serving frontier open-weight models that it does not train itself . Benaich's summary: "you either die trying to get to the frontier, or you live long enough to serve inference" .
Several data points this period:
- Fireworks says it serves more than 40T tokens a day to customers' customized models. Nathan Lambert expects its total to be well above 100T, but that is his forecast, not a reported figure .
- Baseten is building a full platform: Grid (gateway and router), agent sandboxes, and Loops (serverless SFT and RL) . Its new coding router comes within 0.8 points of the pass rate of always using Opus 5.5, at 72% lower cost. That result is on held-out benchmarks, not production workloads .
- Cognition launched SWE-2 Flash, which it says is about 3x faster than SWE-2 at one-fifth the price. It has 276B total and 12B active parameters and was adapted from Thinking Machines' open Inkling-Small. Cognition is holding back the weights over cyber-capability concerns. All benchmark figures are Cognition's own .
- Deep Principle released Hydrogen-1.0, open weights post-trained from GLM-5.3 for science. It reports 38.3% vs. 33.3% for GPT-6 Astra on FrontierScience Research, at about 72% lower output cost, but trails Astra on NMR . These are self-reported results.
The pattern: frontier capability is increasingly something to buy and post-train, and value is collecting in serving, routing and vertical fine-tunes.
a16z: tech buyouts are under stress
a16z's Jen Kha argues that tech buyouts are a late-cycle asset class and that venture does better when a new technology wave is starting . Her evidence:
- PE's share of global buyout deal value going to tech fell from 34% in 2023 to 11% in Q1 2026 .
- About $140B of risky PE-backed loans mature in 2028 and $160B in 2029. About a third is software .
- A typical deal now needs 10–12% annual EBITDA growth to return 2.5x, compared with about 5% in 2015. Meanwhile, Golub's software borrowers slowed from 9% to under 3% revenue growth .
She concedes that smaller buyouts outside leveraged software can still do fine . a16z is a venture firm, so this is its own case for venture.
Deals and teams
- Discovery Loop: Jeff Dean revealed the company, a public benefit corporation co-founded with Oriol Vinyals, Quoc Le and one other Google colleague . It aims to automate experimental loops in ML research and hardware design and make domain experts "20x to 50x more productive." It says it has about 20 automated improvement loops running .
- Phaze: the team that built Parsec raised an $8.75M seed led by Casado at a16z. The product is remote access to real computers for both humans and agents, with handoff of control between them .
- Weave (YC W25): raised a $13.5M Series A led by Standard Capital to measure the output of humans and agents against AI spending. It also launched a model router .
- Eve: the plaintiff-law AI company says 1,700+ of about 29,000 US plaintiff firms use it, and its linked hiring post references $164M in funding .
- Salesforce signed a definitive agreement to acquire Listen Labs. No terms were disclosed .
- Talent: Cat Wu is leaving Anthropic to lead product management for Core Products at OpenAI . Allie K. Miller says that makes three of Anthropic's top product communicators to leave within weeks .
Hustle Fund's October funnel
Hustle Fund received 2,718 deals in October :
- Screening stage: geography caused about 46% of passes. The fund generally passes on companies not set up as US Delaware C-Corps .
- Closer review (370 deals): passes were mostly due to market competition (66%) .
- Sectors: AI/ML was the most common category founders selected, at 41% .
- Valuations (self-reported): 67% were under $10M .
- Just over 100 people attended an agent meetup where 10 AI-assistant builders pitched; participants described the field as an open frontier with no settled landscape. In a separate review of more than 147 assistants, one speaker grouped products as general, work-oriented, multiplayer, or travel-focused, with finance assistants not yet materializing; most products still leaned toward general productivity, while playful and multiplayer formats were emerging alternatives.
- Trust is a prominent reported user concern: about 22% of roughly 3,600 messages in AI-power-user group chats cited it as the main fear. The discussion emphasized permission fences, monitoring, separation of personal and work access, and keeping users in control of consequential actions.
- In a flower-ordering test balancing same-day delivery with low cost, Instinct, Kicker, and Season best handled both constraints; other agents found same-day delivery but tended to deprioritize price. In a separate LA-trip test, Instinct balanced cost and time, Grockbot favored time, and DOTS favored cost—evidence that agents interpret competing preferences differently and may need to elicit preferences and present trade-offs.
- In a test of the top 15 benchmarked agents, all but one would export a memory file for transfer to another agent; the speaker described the resulting files as generally solid, suggesting portability may ease switching.
- The speakers argued that agents’ ability to search patiently could help direct and long-tail brands reach buyers while compressing aggregators, and speculated that clean APIs and documentation could influence agent choices. Separately, they reported sharp performance differences at hundreds of thousands of users, with some products degrading and facing outages—indicating that scaling execution may remain a moat even as software is described as commoditizing.
- Jeff Dean presented Discovery Loop as a new AI-for-science-and-engineering company he co-founded and leads, aiming to automate experimental loops; it is a public benefit corporation with a stated mission to address societal problems and broaden access to its benefits.
- The four-founder team consists of long-time Google colleagues who have worked together for 14–30 years, with experience across Google products and infrastructure, Gemini, AlphaChip, and AlphaFold. The company says roughly 10% of its staff have an ACM prize in computing and 10% have IOI Olympiad medals.
- Discovery Loop says it has built a collaborative agent harness and agent-first infrastructure, with about 20 automated improvement loops running. Its initial focus is machine-learning research and engineering plus hardware design, with a stated goal of making domain experts 20–50× more productive; AI for healthcare is a longer-term ambition, while digitally executed work is currently more amenable to speeding up.
- Dean distinguishes self-improvement—automating experiments to improve a target model—from recursive self-improvement, where the system proposing improvements is itself improved. He says automation can accelerate the process, but computation and experimentation impose physical limits, so improvement cannot run infinitely fast.
- Fei-Fei Li, introduced as World Labs’ co-founder and CEO, said the company’s founding moment came when computer vision and generative models converged, enabling generative models beyond words.
- a16z’s Jen Kha argues that private-equity tech buyout exposure is retreating as the AI-era technology shift unfolds: tech’s share of global buyout deal value rose from 23% in 2018 to 34% in 2023, then fell to 29% in 2025 and 11% in Q1 2026.
- Her case is that leveraged software buyouts face tougher growth hurdles: deals now need roughly 10–12% annual EBITDA growth versus about 5% for 2015 deals, while software borrowers tracked by Golub Capital saw revenue growth slow from 9% to under 3% in two years. She argues venture is better suited to the early stage of a technology wave, but says smaller buyouts outside leveraged software may still do well; she also cautions that venture/buyout comparisons are illustrative because company stages, capital structures and valuation methods differ.
- For disruptive-tech deals, the investor favors diligence on the technical approach, adjacent markets, pace of evolution, value capture, team, customer use, adjacent budgets and early willingness to pay. He cautions that business models and monetization lag disruptive technology, so mature revenue-quality or TAM tests can be premature.
- AI may reopen the infrastructure stack: the investor treats models as infrastructure and distinguishes agent-generated software that still needs conventional compute and databases from new AI-native systems. He sees potential for new OLTP databases and networking entrants, including optical and materials changes, while agent-runtime abstractions remain unsettled. He is confident digital tasks can ultimately be solved with enough capital and simulation/RL, but says it is unknown whether the same scaling applies to robotics, physical science or medicine.
- The investor says frontier models captured over 80% of dollar-weighted demand during three years of rapid market growth, while enterprise AI budget penetration is roughly 1% or less by his estimate. He puts model lifetimes at about three to six months and warns that a delayed release could quickly cost a provider its market. If demand saturates, value could shift toward open source; however, he argues that task saturation alone does not make cheaper models viable when competing firms may still pay 10× for the most capable model.
- The investor sees AI turning some software development from an engineering bottleneck into a capital-resourcing problem, though returns on large deployments remain uncertain. For neoclouds, he identifies hardware supply and power as the immediate constraints, expects roughly 80% of the market to go to scale providers and the remainder to fragmented niches, and separately warns that tighter debt availability favors investment-grade firms; less creditworthy providers may need customer prepayments.
- In recounting Cursor's strategic transaction, he says the company was nearing a large raise when model-building needs increased its need for compute; SpaceX had compute, while Cursor had a large user base, data and a team experienced in building models. His broader advice is that strategic deals depend on trust and a credible case for expanding into a large market, while leaks can destabilize negotiations.
- Baseten shared initial results for Baseten Router, which routes coding tasks between Opus 5.5 and the cheaper GLM-5.3 Flash according to predicted task success and cost.
- On held-out DeepSWE 1.1, SWE Atlas QnA, and Terminal-Bench 2.1, Baseten reports pass rate within 0.8 percentage points of always using Opus 5.5 at 72% lower cost; it also reports statistically beating random routing at every threshold, the only evaluated router to do so on these benchmarks.
- The router combines structured task attributes with internal model activations. Results remain benchmark-stage: Baseten says production validation is its next focus and it is working with design partners; it cautions that relative performance may differ by workload and that evaluated routers used different model pools.
- The hosts’ thesis is that communities can grow alongside AI without being AI products, and that communities, networks, and marketplaces may remain defensible moats. NADA 20 Groups illustrates the model: members reportedly pay about $6,000–$8,000 annually to join groups of 24 noncompeting business owners who compare P&Ls; one host estimates $13–$15 million in annual revenue and suggests adapting the model to less-competitive professions.
- The hosts cite BNI as a scaled local referral network with 800,000 members, low-thousands annual dues, and a recent acquisition; a billion-plus-dollar price is described only as a rumor. Moda, a collector marketplace run through roughly two dozen Facebook groups, is described as having 600,000 members and more than a dozen full-time employees; dealers are vetted, and a host estimates $5–$10 million in yearly revenue. A cohost warns that reliance on Facebook creates platform risk if changes to reach or member-add rules hurt the business.
- A consumer-commerce model discussed is app-based collectible pack openings with buyback credit for unwanted pulls—for example, a $50 pack with a $43 buyback offer—encouraging another purchase while allowing the card to be resold. The hosts compare the mechanic to gacha-style gambling and caution that headline revenue may include GMV alongside card costs and fulfillment, rather than representing straightforward net revenue.
- Open-weight adoption is accelerating among startups and established companies to reduce costs; enterprises also value on-prem deployment for data privacy and residency. Providers may monetize through inference or cloud lock-in, revenue-sharing licenses, and enterprise contracts; Alibaba can pair models with cloud, while US open-weight providers may need other routes such as custom enterprise work.
- Task-specific harnesses are a potential startup opportunity: they can tailor capable models to specialized work and may themselves be a revenue stream. Standardized pre-deployment evaluation suites for harnesses are lacking, and evaluating agentic workloads can cost millions; startups may favor frontier APIs initially, then optimize open models on-prem as they scale.
- Chinese open-weight labs are gaining prominence, while Hugging Face’s policy chief says buyers still want US-developed open models. She cites geopolitics, perceived data-location risks, and differences in model refusals or values as factors in buyer choices, while noting that US-based inference arrangements can avoid sending data to mainland China.
- Open infrastructure carries security and support costs: an approximately 48-hour agentic attack on OpenCode sought third-party API keys and caused financial damage, while Hugging Face’s earlier incident reportedly did not compromise user or financial data. The interviewee says permissive communities and valuable data or keys make platforms targets, and that smaller providers cannot match closed labs’ product support even as defenders need access to permissive models.
- a16z partner Jen Kha argues that buyouts are a late-cycle strategy and venture is better positioned when a new technology wave begins. She reports PE-backed tech exit value was down 77% year over year and buyout fundraising fell 16% to $395B in 2025, still lagging at midyear 2026.
- Kha cites a financing overhang: about $140B of risky loans owed by PE-backed companies mature in 2028 and $160B in 2029; roughly one-third is software and one-quarter is rated CCC+ or below.
- US buyout funds trailed the Russell 3000 for every vintage since 2019. Over the reported 10-year period, US buyout returned 14.5% annually, below the Russell 3000, while US venture returned 17.6%, 2.3 points above the index and unlevered. Kha notes that the comparison is illustrative because venture and buyout differ in company stage, capital structure, and valuation methodology.
- The venture case is selective rather than a claim that the whole asset class is strong: Kha says exits slowed sharply after 2021 and argues that returns depend on access to top-5% managers rather than the median; she says VC track records have remained meaningful predictors of the next fund.
Weave (YC W25) helps engineering teams assess whether AI coding tools improve productivity by measuring human and agent output against AI spending; it recently raised a $13.5M Series A led by Standard Capital and launched Weave Router to select models for coding tasks. The company describes a progression from measuring tools such as Cursor to helping teams build software factories that can work autonomously, with a focus on measuring agent output and spreading the practices of strong AI users.
Perplexity CEO Aravind Srinivas framed the company’s agents as outperforming ad agencies for business owners . In a company-shared Get Maine Lobster case study, its Computer agent managed $30,000 in Meta ad spend and reportedly delivered 3.5× revenue and 63% higher ROAS than the business’s usual ads by automating creative analysis, ad production, and media buying .
- The speaker advises academic founders to prioritize what users will adopt and pay for over grades, citations, or interesting research without practical impact , and argues that solving an unmet customer problem can matter more than technical novelty .
- In his Focal example, three months spent training retail people-tracking models produced insights stores would not pay for; he says manual video labeling could have yielded the same result . He recommends AI startups validate demand with a human-in-the-loop approach before spending heavily on model training or compute .
- He also argues academic founders must personally take on work such as sales, marketing, product development, hiring, and managing cash runway, rather than outsource business responsibilities while remaining focused on research .
- a16z says the 2010s buyout playbook is unlikely to return: PE-backed tech exit value was down 77% year over year, and buyout fundraising fell 16% in 2025 to $395 billion and was still lagging at midyear 2026. It says large firms and 2021 software deals are weighing on benchmarks, while smaller buyouts outside leveraged software may still do well.
- Among the top 5% of US funds from 2007–16 vintages, venture returned 8.5x TVPI, including 5.3x in cash, versus buyout at 3.8x TVPI and 3.5x in cash. The article argues that venture track records remain predictive and the best firms tend to attract top founders.
- a16z frames the current period as the start of a major technology wave, but cautions that the VC/buyout comparison is illustrative because the funds hold companies at different stages and use different capital structures and valuation methods.
Assistant Benchmark creator David Pawlan says he has tracked 147 AI assistants; in AI power users’ group chats, trust was the top fear, appearing in 22% of roughly 3,600 messages. The discussion argues stated privacy concerns can diverge from revealed behavior: consumers may grant broad data access for small benefits, citing a promotion where $30 in pizza reportedly required access to an entire Google Workspace; it also identifies embarrassment and social signaling as potentially higher-stakes concerns than practical real-world consequences. Pawlan’s benchmark tests agents on competing preferences, such as finding low-cost same-day flowers or planning a luxurious yet cost-efficient LA weekend, making preference trade-offs a concrete evaluation dimension.
Google, Anthropic, and Databricks were founded by PhD-holding founders, but YC presents them as exceptions and cautions that academic instincts can work against building a startup . YC’s guidance for researcher-founders is to prioritize important problems and customer demand over interesting or novel research, move faster with imperfect information, and talk directly with customers . The advice comes from YC Visiting Partner Francois, who is a PhD student, previously researched in Fei-Fei Li’s lab, and founded and ran Focal Systems (W16) .
Nathan Benaich called Europe “in managed decline” and warned that “we cannot miss this moment because we are distracted by side quests”; his text does not specify the moment or distractions, so this signals broad concern about Europe’s trajectory and focus rather than a concrete technology or investment development.
Garry Tan says GStack’s /review skill is useful for preventing bugs, a positive but unelaborated signal about the tool’s developer workflow value.
Garry Tan said California tech builders had “dodged a bullet” on an asset-seizure tax, hoped Prop 42 would pass, and argued that asset seizure threatens abundance and could kill the state’s tech “golden goose.”
- a16z reports latest-available median software revenue growth of 3–7% for PE-backed companies, 10–16% for public software, and 18–30% for VC-backed private software; it says top companies staying private longer means more of their growth occurs before IPO.
- Its essay says PE tech’s share of buyout deal value rose from 23% in 2018 to about one-third after ChatGPT launched, then began retreating. It also reports PE-backed software borrowers’ revenue growth fell from 9% to under 3% in two years, though EBITDA continued growing through margin expansion; meanwhile, the essay estimates a typical buyout now needs 10–12% annual EBITDA growth to reach 2.5x in five years, versus about 5% for a 2015 deal.
- a16z cautions that venture/buyout comparisons are illustrative because the funds hold companies at different stages and use different capital structures and valuation methods.
Scott Kupor spent 16 years helping grow Andreessen Horowitz from 3 people to about 700; an interview teaser highlights the firm’s borrowing of Michael Ovitz’s CAA playbook and its Skype deal as historical topics.
- Sequoia is closing its London office, saying it no longer needs a local presence but will continue supporting European outlier founders from the Bay Area; it has also combined Early and Growth into one team.
- Luciana Lixandru says she will remain a Sequoia partner, continue serving on portfolio boards, stay in Europe, and personally invest in the next generation of European founders. She says her conviction in Europe is unchanged and that investing there has been her life’s work since 2011.
- She cites partnering with founders in the very early days at Pennylane, STARK, Profound, Rillet, Robco, Serval, Nevis, Avelios, Aspora, and Trade Republic.
Is Private Equity Cooked?

Most people I talk to agree that tech buyouts are in a tough spot right now. Yet, LP $s continue to flow into re-ups with these same managers. In other words:

Tech buyouts have historically been the “safe” bet within private markets. To use a real estate analogy: it’s the good house, on an ideal street, with a reliable stream of buyers. Venture, in contrast, was always the undeveloped lot on the other side of town…until recently.
Tech buyout is a late-cycle asset class. It’s most effective once a technology wave has settled and when business models are predictable enough to borrow against. When a new technology wave drops, all bets are off. By contrast, that’s when venture shines (opens in new tab).
Have we seen this movie before? Yes, twice. Top quartile venture beat top quartile buyout through the internet build-out and again through mobile and cloud. But in between, for the vintages caught in and after the dot-com bust (roughly 1998 to 2005), venture trailed.

I believe we’re still at the start of the next technological wave today. The pattern you see is also why the most fatal error in venture is trying to time innovation. LPs who keep consistently committing across vintages catch the lags but can also catch the absurd highs.
For those thinking: maybe that kind of VC lumpiness isn’t for me. Fair. But the slow-and-steady playbook in tech buyout is under a lot more stress than most people realize. You can already see it in how funds value what they own: in the first half of 2026, venture funds marked their tech companies up 16%, while buyout funds only marked their tech holdings down 4%.¹

Of course, some of the stress is cyclical, but IMO this is a bigger structural change.
Most buyouts today are take-privates or companies bought from another sponsor, financed with debt, in an economy changing faster than at any point since the internet. Recall the “safe bet” house analogy earlier: if the neighborhood is being rezoned, you bought at the top (looking at you, 2021) and you have an adjustable-rate mortgage: ring ring—your lender is calling.

Don’t get me wrong: venture got caught in the go-go days of 2021 as well. But the difference is that we mark our assets down, sigh deeply and move on, because a venture fund doesn’t depend on every house on the block surviving. In fact, venture thrives in uncertainty. Every bet we make is essentially an out-of-the-money call option, and we’re okay with the zeroes because we’re after the power-law outliers—the fund returners.
The big private equity bonanza
Ironically, the origins of buyout looked a lot closer to venture. Some early returns were lumpy and outlier-driven e.g., Wesray’s 1982 buyout of Gibson Greetings was $1M of equity on an ~$80M deal and the company went public 16 months later at a valuation ~$290M. That’s how leverage became the 9th wonder of the world for PE (8th wonder, of course, being ‘compounding’, per Warren Buffett!).
The second buyout wave was buying family businesses and “professionalizing” them: improving the business, cutting costs, growing earnings and utilizing cheap leverage along the way.
Fast forward 40 years and PE has chewed through the “fixer uppers”—back to our housing analogy—and many homes on the block have already had a PE owner at some point. What PE tends to buy today is a company that another sponsor already owned or, in the biggest deals, a public company that has been taken private, usually with a plan to cut costs. In 2025, about half of US PE exits by count were sales to another sponsor (PitchBook).

The 2010s were the golden years for buyouts: low interest rates led to steadily rising multiples, which Bain says “powered over 50% of all buyout returns”.² That meant shorter holds and quick distributions. Meanwhile, global buyout assets under management grew from $1.6 trillion in 2015 to $3.9 trillion in 2021. Put bluntly, falling rates and a flood of new money likely bailed out a lot of deals.
SaaS, of course, was also the manna from heaven for private equity: capital-light, consistent recurring revenue that was easy to lend against, lots of small markets with clear leaders, and a small but critical line in the customer’s budget, so prices could go up.
But where did ‘PE investing in SaaS’ come from? Venture funded it—unlevered—in the mid-2000s when the model was new and unproven. PE bought it in the 2010s, once it was mature, predictable and easy to borrow against.³ But what happens when the music stops?
What’s left when you turn on the lights
The math today looks different.
Over the past decade, US buyouts have slowly underperformed the public markets, which have been increasingly powered by the tech Mag 7.

And that’s typically with borrowed money.
PE-backed middle-market companies carry 4.7–6.0x adjusted EBITDA in net debt across the 2019–25 vintages, roughly 2.5 to 3x the median S&P 500 company’s 2x (J.P. Morgan).
So buyout has trailed public stocks while carrying far more debt. Over the last 10 years, US Buyout returned 14.5% a year, underperforming the Russell 3000. In contrast, US venture as a whole returned 17.6% a year over the same period (pooled across all funds), 2.3 points ahead of the Russell 3000. Unlevered.
But what about distributions?

PE cash back is down and exits now take an average of about 7 years, up from 5 to 6 years in 2010–21.⁴

Venture, of course, has its own distribution problem as well: exits slowed sharply after 2021. But venture is a power-law business, and the case to invest in venture lies in the access to the top 5% of managers, not the median. So let’s compare the best with the best across both.
A top 5% US venture fund (2007–16 vintages) was 5.3x DPI. A top 5% US buyout fund? 3.5x DPI.
Moreover, for the top 5% performance, a top US venture fund has nearly 2.2x better TVPI than a top buyout fund.

It’s important to consider also that in venture, winning tends to beget winning: the best firms typically get the next call from the best founders. A venture firm’s track record has stayed a meaningful predictor of its next fund, while for buyouts, since 2000, last fund’s top quartile hasn’t reliably predicted the next.⁵ So if you’re asking yourself “how do I choose the top VC managers?”, the answer is fairly straightforward.
Lastly, there is an extreme difference in what’s being held. DPI in venture is waiting on companies that are likely still growing and are raising their Series M (opens in new tab), but buyout is usually waiting on levered companies whose value has gone flat, valuations have not necessarily been marked down to reality and there are no obvious buyers.
The roughest parts: 2021-2022
Trouble in homeownership usually starts when the unimaginable happens: you bought near the top, the rate resets higher and the appraisal goes flat. That’s exactly what happened to a large slice of what PE bought in 2021 and 2022, as we all know by now.
Many of these companies can’t cover interest in cash anymore, so they’re adding it to the loan. For those borrowers, loan-to-value went from 44% to 75% in a year. Sadly though, when the mortgage outgrows the house, the lender takes the keys.

Look at when those companies were bought: 70% of the debt foreclosed in 2025–26 came from 2021 or 2022 deals. Deals done after rates went up barely appear. It isn’t just the middle market. Private equity firms backed 54% of the largest US corporate bankruptcies during 2025.⁶
Medallia is a good example here. Thoma Bravo, arguably the best software operator in private equity, bought it in 2021 for about $6.4 billion. This year, it handed the company to a group of lenders led by Blackstone, wiping out about $5.1 billion of equity for Thoma Bravo and its co-investors. If a sponsor of that caliber couldn’t make a 2021 deal work, blame the vintage. And for some LPs, there’s no escaping it: the credit fund that took the keys and the buyout fund that lost the equity often sit in the same portfolio. The risk simply moved from one pocket to the other.
But if the house is in trouble, why don’t the appraisals show it? As the youths say: bruh, it’s because the people who own the house are the ones doing the appraising!

In venture, a fund’s marks go up when a company raises a new round at a higher price. Meaning, more VCs show up with more checks. Yes, perhaps you can debate that VCs chase hot deals like little kids running after a soccer ball. But no one’s in the business of lighting cash on fire. If a mark goes up, it’s because the market believes the company is worth more.
PE is the opposite: it owns the company outright and its market price is decided behind closed doors by the people who own it. Even if the business is struggling, it’s very easy to bury your head in the sand and keep the valuation where it was. As they say, more fiction has been written in Excel than in Word.
So when no outside buyer shows up, more sponsors sell the company to a new continuation fund they also manage, with secondary investors putting up the cash. These “continuation vehicles” made up 14% of PE exit value in the first half of 2026, up from 5% in 2020 (Jefferies).

Some funds go even a step further and borrow against the whole portfolio to send cash back to LPs, so distributions go up without a single company being sold. These NAV loans can flatter reported returns, and they add a second layer of debt on top of what the companies already owe.⁷
Investors who trade these assets every day price them lower than the funds that hold them: BDCs (publicly traded funds that lend money to private, mid-sized companies, many of them owned by PE firms) heavy in software trade well below NAV, and default rates range from 1–3% to about 15% depending on what you count. Realized losses are still under 1%, which means the losses haven’t been taken yet.

In summary, about $140B of risky loans owed by PE-backed companies mature in 2028, and another $160B in 2029. In 2023–25, the amount coming due two years out averaged about $60B. About a third of it is software, and a quarter is already rated CCC+ or below.⁸
Maybe it’s cyclical, maybe it’s structural
So what’s the outlook? Optimists will say that rates will come down and the debt will get cheaper. Then again, PE-backed tech exit value is down 77% from this time last year:

Keep in mind, also, that many would-be buyers of application software are software companies whose own shares have fallen, so they’re not able to pay up.⁹ Finally, the buyers who are able to buy, are buying new technology: Nvidia agreeing to buy Hugging Face for $13 billion or SpaceX acquiring Cursor for $60 billion. The old stuff is sitting on the shelf.
And finally, buyout fundraising is seeing the same headwinds. It fell 16% in 2025, to $395 billion, and was still lagging at midyear 2026.
It is safe to say that the 2010s aren’t coming back anytime soon: a supply of fixer-uppers, a decade of falling rates, and fast-growing funds that kept buying from each other at higher prices. A few rate cuts help the debt; they don’t re-create that decade.
And at the very top of the market, the incentives have shifted too. Many of the biggest buyout firms are now public companies, and IMO the scoreboard has quietly moved from focusing on outperformance through returns to a business valued on AUM.
Furthermore: 12 is the new 5. According to Bain, a typical 2015 buyout needed about 5% a year of EBITDA growth to make 2.5x in five years, with rising multiples doing much of the work. Today debt costs more and covers less of the price, while entry prices haven’t come down and aren’t rising anymore, so the same deal needs 10–12%.

Can these companies easily go from 5% to 12% EBITDA growth? No.
Golub Capital, one of the biggest lenders to PE-backed companies, tracks how its borrowers are doing every quarter. Its software borrowers went from 9% revenue growth to under 3% in two years. EBITDA is still growing, so it has become a margin story. And that helps pay the interest. But it isn’t the growth those deals were likely priced for.

Compare that to venture, where companies are priced on revenue growth rather than EBITDA: the median is about 18–30% a year, and outliers like Revolut, Databricks, SpaceX and Anduril grew revenue 46%, 80%+, 92% and 100%+, respectively. These are venture growth companies, not scrappy seed bets. And because the best companies are staying private longer than ever, more of that growth is happening before they ever hit the public markets.
What exacerbates this even more is PE increased tech exposure late product cycle: tech went from 23% of buyout deal value in 2018 to about 1/3 not long after ChatGPT launched in late 2022. And since then PE has begun to retreat from tech.

So, is private equity cooked?
Not overnight, no. Capital is sticky, and the best buyout managers will adapt. To be fair, smaller buyouts outside levered software can still do just fine. It’s the giants and the 2021 software that are weighing on the benchmarks. But the conditions that made the 2010s are gone: a supply of fixer-uppers, a decade of falling rates, and funds buying from each other at higher prices. A few rate cuts won’t recreate them.
My advice is to call your manager today about those 2021-2022 vintages and find out how much interest is being added to the loan (PIK). Then find an exit route.
And if the instinct is to trim buyout and move into private credit or secondaries, look at who’s on the other side of this essay. Private credit loans to SaaS companies grew from about $8 billion in 2015 to more than $500 billion by the end of 2025 (BIS), and the lender’s upside is capped at the interest they’re owed. Secondaries mostly buy existing buyout stakes at a discount. Either way, you’re still holding the same buyout companies, with less to gain.
Which leaves venture. When people tell me that venture is still riskier at the median, I agree and ask: why are you in the median? Proximity to venture does not equal participation in its rewards. If you’re going to be in venture, you need to be in the top 5%. From there, the difference between the asset classes is stark.
And venture has grown up from its cottage industry: in May, Anthropic raised $65 billion in a single round. That’s more than the $56.6 billion Electronic Arts take-private, which Bain calls the largest buyout on record.¹⁰ At the current market cap speculation between $1.5-$2T, that’s almost half of the current PE NAV today.
We believe we’re at the beginning of a massive technological wave and the white space to build and innovate is boundless. As my partner Martin Casado famously said (opens in new tab):

My addendum to that is about returns: if you’re re-upping into buyout today, be prepared for the soy sauce and salt grains in your eyeballs—whether intentional or not.
¹ MSCI; holding-level, gross of fees. Worth noting that venture and buyout funds generally hold companies at different stages of development, with different capital structures and valuation methodologies; comparisons between the two are illustrative only.
² Bain, Global Private Equity Report 2026
⁴ Bain & Company, Global Private Equity Report 2026 (February 2026)
⁵ Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan & Stucke, Journal of Corporate Finance, 2023
⁶ Bankruptcies with liabilities of $1 billion or greater at the time of filing.
⁸ Wall Street Journal, PitchBook
⁹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2026
¹⁰ Bain & Company, Global Private Equity Report, February 2026.
The above reflects the subjective views and beliefs of a16z Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) or its respective affiliates, and is not, and is not intended to be, an offer to sell – or a solicitation of an offer to buy – any securities, and may not be used or relied upon in evaluating the merits of any investment. It should not be construed as or relied upon in any manner as investment, legal, tax, or other advice. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Any charts provided here or on a16z content distribution outlets are for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation. All content speaks only as of the date indicated. There can be no assurances that a16z’s investment objectives will be achieved or investment strategies will be successful. Any investment in a vehicle managed by a16z involves a high degree of risk including the risk that the entire amount invested is lost. Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z; visithttps://a16z.com/investment-list/ (opens in new tab) for a full list of investments. Other important information can be found ata16z.com/disclosures (opens in new tab).
- a16z’s Jen Kha argues that private-equity tech buyout exposure is retreating as the AI-era technology shift unfolds: tech’s share of global buyout deal value rose from 23% in 2018 to 34% in 2023, then fell to 29% in 2025 and 11% in Q1 2026.
- Her case is that leveraged software buyouts face tougher growth hurdles: deals now need roughly 10–12% annual EBITDA growth versus about 5% for 2015 deals, while software borrowers tracked by Golub Capital saw revenue growth slow from 9% to under 3% in two years. She argues venture is better suited to the early stage of a technology wave, but says smaller buyouts outside leveraged software may still do well; she also cautions that venture/buyout comparisons are illustrative because company stages, capital structures and valuation methods differ.
- a16z partner Jen Kha argues that buyouts are a late-cycle strategy and venture is better positioned when a new technology wave begins. She reports PE-backed tech exit value was down 77% year over year and buyout fundraising fell 16% to $395B in 2025, still lagging at midyear 2026.
- Kha cites a financing overhang: about $140B of risky loans owed by PE-backed companies mature in 2028 and $160B in 2029; roughly one-third is software and one-quarter is rated CCC+ or below.
- US buyout funds trailed the Russell 3000 for every vintage since 2019. Over the reported 10-year period, US buyout returned 14.5% annually, below the Russell 3000, while US venture returned 17.6%, 2.3 points above the index and unlevered. Kha notes that the comparison is illustrative because venture and buyout differ in company stage, capital structure, and valuation methodology.
- The venture case is selective rather than a claim that the whole asset class is strong: Kha says exits slowed sharply after 2021 and argues that returns depend on access to top-5% managers rather than the median; she says VC track records have remained meaningful predictors of the next fund.
- a16z says the 2010s buyout playbook is unlikely to return: PE-backed tech exit value was down 77% year over year, and buyout fundraising fell 16% in 2025 to $395 billion and was still lagging at midyear 2026. It says large firms and 2021 software deals are weighing on benchmarks, while smaller buyouts outside leveraged software may still do well.
- Among the top 5% of US funds from 2007–16 vintages, venture returned 8.5x TVPI, including 5.3x in cash, versus buyout at 3.8x TVPI and 3.5x in cash. The article argues that venture track records remain predictive and the best firms tend to attract top founders.
- a16z frames the current period as the start of a major technology wave, but cautions that the VC/buyout comparison is illustrative because the funds hold companies at different stages and use different capital structures and valuation methods.
- a16z reports latest-available median software revenue growth of 3–7% for PE-backed companies, 10–16% for public software, and 18–30% for VC-backed private software; it says top companies staying private longer means more of their growth occurs before IPO.
- Its essay says PE tech’s share of buyout deal value rose from 23% in 2018 to about one-third after ChatGPT launched, then began retreating. It also reports PE-backed software borrowers’ revenue growth fell from 9% to under 3% in two years, though EBITDA continued growing through margin expansion; meanwhile, the essay estimates a typical buyout now needs 10–12% annual EBITDA growth to reach 2.5x in five years, versus about 5% for a 2015 deal.
- a16z cautions that venture/buyout comparisons are illustrative because the funds hold companies at different stages and use different capital structures and valuation methods.
- a16z’s Jen Kha argues that venture is advantaged when a new technology wave begins, while tech buyouts work best after business models stabilize; she believes the current period is at the start of such a wave.
- For 2007–16 vintages, top-5% US venture funds returned 5.3x DPI versus 3.5x for top-5% buyout funds; Kha frames venture’s case as access to top managers rather than the median. She cautions that the comparison is illustrative because the asset classes differ in company stage, capital structure, and valuation methods.
- Tech-buyout stress indicators include venture funds marking tech holdings up 16% in H1 2026 while buyout funds marked theirs down 4%, 70% of debt foreclosed in 2025–26 originating in 2021–22 deals, and typical buyouts now needing 10–12% annual EBITDA growth to reach 2.5x in five years versus about 5% in 2015. Kha says smaller buyouts outside levered software can still do well; large funds and 2021 software deals are weighing on benchmarks.