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Big Ideas
The PM role is being decoupled from the pod ratio. Whatnot maps PMs to problems and core projects rather than teams; engineers and designers can be DRIs, and a team may go a year or more without an attached PM. Tom Verrilli says AI makes this more viable: PMs can pull nuanced cohort data, inspect product logic through the codebase, and senior PMs can cover more surface area. The durable work is identifying what to build, translating requirements, prioritizing ROI, improving design, and linking customer, business, and tech—not alignment theater. Staff PMs where decision complexity warrants them, and keep them close to support, data, engineering, and design.
Play the accordion. Verrilli’s framework avoids both spaghetti iteration and multi-year roadmap documents: define the larger goal, ship the smallest V1, then re-evaluate and plan the next move. In Whatnot’s live commerce, zero-minute listings help seller throughput but hurt discovery; mandatory listings could reduce throughput because each takes about 3.5 minutes. Every local win needs a zoom-out for knock-on effects.
Tactical Playbook
Treat repeated misses as a calibration signal, not automatically a performance failure. Count genuinely completed items per week for 10–12 weeks, without points. Stable throughput with missed commitments means the target is over-calibrated; falling or volatile throughput points to dependencies, unclear requirements, attrition, or technical debt. Punishing misses incentivizes sandbagging and destroys forecast signal; publish confidence ranges instead of a single date.
Use a three-layer metric spec. A LinkedIn discussion proposed incremental Premium subscribers as primary, top jobs per user as secondary, and listing CTR as a guardrail. One commenter hypothesized that inflated job postings could serve paying recruiters while wasting seekers’ time; treat that as a product-risk hypothesis, not verified company intent. Pair the scorecard with denominator checks: one reported funnel error treated high checkout among users who already had cart items as a win.
Case Studies & Lessons
Signups and polished acquisition do not establish value. A Spanish-school founder tried kids and adults, below-, at-, and above-market pricing, and polished site and ads, yet free demo bookings no-showed; a $1 booking fee killed bookings, and only five people attended, none purchasing. A reply recommended narrowing to a must-have niche rather than competing with Duolingo or free resources. In a separate AI-fitness example, 5,000 dormant signups and roughly 1,000 new signups in a month produced no revenue; the useful diagnostic is whether users actually use and like the solution—customer-problem fit is not problem-solution or product-market fit.
Career Corner
Make the work inspectable. Whatnot says 31,832 PM applicants in two years produced one hire; it looks for macro and micro thinking, fast validation, and specificity about decisions and things built, not alignment narratives. Its advice for job seekers is to do IC work now: scope problems, define “good,” pull data, and understand systems. For domain pivots, a gaming-PM practitioner recommends carrying quantified outcomes such as retention, engagement, and upsell; another reports leaving gaming for two other industries.
Tools & Resources
Price agent tooling by solved task, not subscription price. In one Product Compass benchmark covering 105 hidden bugs, Luna max fixed 33 for $1.80 per run versus Fable’s 29 for $104; the same model at high effort fixed 13, making effort a major variable. The article reports token-price gaps of 20–25x and observed spreads up to 90x, while max was slower. Use max for planning and large asynchronous implementations, high for small fixes and summaries, and benchmark representative work before switching. The associated ChatGPT desktop app supports autonomous loops, project-level skills/MCP, and manual compaction, with Plus listed as enough to start.
Whatnot’s anti-ratio PM philosophy — Tom Verilli, CPO of Whatnot (ex-Twitch CPO)
- Whatnot’s product org was built on the premise “We regret that product management exists” . The intent: don’t hire a PM just for the sake of hiring one — hire where there’s a specific need , and don’t assume a PM is needed in every place . PM is “a trade, not a qualification,” a muscle built by reps; the more PMs abstract engineers and designers from product decisions, the more those muscles underdevelop .
- The pattern he attacks: the “HR ratio” of pods — every six engineers gets a designer, a PM, an EM — which produced PMs where none are needed (e.g., notifications infrastructure) and “infantilizes” engineers/designers who are perfectly capable of making good decisions .
- Implementation at Whatnot: PMs are mapped to problems and core projects, not teams — an engineering team can go a year without a PM while product work continues; the org’s docs are explicit that a DRI for new product development can be an engineer or a designer, but everyone goes through the same product-review rigor .
- Org shape: ~21–22 PMs loosely grouped into buyer, seller, and trust-and-risk; PMs get reallocated often. Every six months the CEO, CPO, and senior leads define what needs to be true, go through the list, assign a DRI per critical project, and grab a PM when a high-priority item has no owner — overwhelmingly the DRIs end up being PMs .
Hiring: what’s changing
- Whatnot got 31,832 PM applicants in two years and hired one .
- Trending down in interviews: candidates who lead with driving alignment, stakeholder management, and relationships — a cohort whose specialty was “politics,” not technical or customer insight .
- Trending up: showing both macro and micro thinking — describing the end state while being visibly impatient to validate it quickly — and being specific about things you personally built and decided, not products you “babysat” at a scale company .
- Every hire at Whatnot, in any role, does a hands-on case study; candidates who present beautifully often decay when forced to verbally defend a POV on a prompt plus data — a screen for “product theater” .
- Building systems thinking: in reviews always ask “what do we do if it’s green? what if red?”; mentally play out 1000x usage and knock-on effects; internal motto “know then go” — think through all the risks and where scale breaks, then move anyway .
- Advice to PMs in the shifted job market: start doing IC work in your current role and push internally for practical work; rebuild the muscles of scoping the right thing, understanding the problem, and defining what good looks like .
The shift back to IC work
- Previously the ladder promoted your A players into directors and out of doing things; at Whatnot the ~4–5 PM managers spend 90%+ of their time on IC work and Verilli spends ~50% — “why wouldn’t you want Messi playing for your team rather than the academy coming along all the time?” .
- IC work for senior PMs = sitting in support tickets, pulling data yourself, sitting with engineering and design, querying the codebase, writing specs, running standups. Verilli has shipped production code himself but doesn’t think it’s the best use of his time .
- Why it works: senior ICs make faster, more intuitive decisions and see more of the business — one VP can cover what stacked junior PM layers would — and fewer layers cut alignment politics. Concrete example: at Twitch, discovery and ads teams were “always at war for impressions”; one PM accountable for both organically aligned the trade-off (feed GMV via organic vs. paid) and cut months of back-and-forth .
- Comp logic: total the comp of five L5s + four L7s + a VP, and you could instead pay three ICs director/VP-level money given their impact .
- He recruits senior folks sick of alignment meetings (“don’t you miss actually doing things?”) and expects a bifurcation — some orgs are large enough that IC-everywhere isn’t right .
Leadership, coaching, and founder-CPO dynamics
- “Hire great people and get out of their way” is wrong; the model is “verify then trust.” Leaders must go deep with teams periodically — founder CEO Grant clears his day to pull up tickets, code, and data line by line — because “you can’t make good macro decisions without the micro”; Verilli aims to be T-shaped (broad, deep when required) .
- Top-down leadership works well when leadership is good enough to be in the weeds and specifically correct; “micromanagement” is managing from above without ground truth. Junior ICs are stoked to work alongside the CEO/CPO because they’re simply unblocked .
- CPO–founder operating rules: if a founder is already on something, step out rather than create the team’s “two dads problem”; before joining, calibrate (Verilli did 5–6 coffees plus a full day jamming on real problems with the founders); the job is translating the founder’s vision into reality, not competing for it .
- Pushing back on the CEO: start from curiosity — “am I hearing you right that this is your prior? is there context I don’t have?” — then ask if their mind is made up; if it’s two opinions and nobody has data, “the CEO’s opinion is going to win,” so check your ego or go get data .
- Coaching: stop the “review yo-yo” — a junior PM bouncing the same PRD through review after review; instead help people understand what good looks like relatively quickly and keep moving .
Frameworks and hard-won lessons
- “Play the accordion”: stretch out to define what you’re trying to get done, compress by shipping V1, then stretch again with what you just learned. Value is created in the compress (shipping); the stretch alone is not value. Roadmap-only and iteration-only both fail — you need both, constantly zooming out and pushing back in .
- Worked example: Whatnot historically didn’t need listings (sellers can hold an item up — zero minutes vs. ~3.5 minutes per listing), but zooming out reveals new buyers will expect search to work; forcing all sellers to make listings would slash how much they can sell per hour. The loop of trade-offs is the point .
- Twitter lessons: real product-market fit is “bottling lightning” — it survives even badly run orgs, and network effects keep the product alive through chaos; and “most of the time you hear ‘it’s really complex,’ it isn’t. Leadership is just weak” — the 140-character limit took endless working groups because nobody would make the call, and shipped ~1.5–2 years after he left with nobody dying .
- A failure pattern to avoid: “averages mean nothing to the individual.” A feature used by only 3% may be 100% of a segment’s core use case; deprecating it can spiral through network effects — and in e-commerce it’s someone’s business. “When you have data and an anecdote, trust the anecdote” (Bezos) .
AI and the future of the PM role
- AI isn’t the root cause of the fewer-PMs model but makes it viable: “you can have one very senior PM across more things and they can be more efficient than having three relatively entry-level PMs” .
- Top AI leverage for PMs: (1) self-serve data science on tools like Hex — nuanced cohort reports, sensitivity models, forecasts — Verilli now spends ~10x more time in data and far less with data scientists; (2) querying the codebase through Claude instead of polling engineers for how systems work; (3) real-time feedback loops — watching a customer struggle live while analyzing the codebase to distinguish a bug from a comprehension gap .
- PM skills are the most durable — genuinely understanding the customer, business, and tech and translating across them — but many titled PMs spent the last five years getting good at storytelling, alignment, and frameworks, i.e., Marty Cagan’s “product theater,” and “there’s not a lot of place to hide in that anymore” .
- Ripple effects on other roles: data scientists shift toward fixing tracking/attribution and data labeling (orgs historically underinvested there) and reviewing others’ half-baked self-serve analysis ; trending up is an “engineering manager light” — a hybrid tech-lead/EM running a small incubated team to take swings at problems once considered too hard . Fewer people per unit of output needn’t mean net fewer roles if the company grows faster .
- Future team shape: specialist designer/engineer/PM teams remain for high-conviction projects, while at the edges anyone well-versed in customer problems and the codebase — designer, engineer, PM, or data scientist — gets more free space to go fix things .
- Strategic view: agents will take over programmatic and high-intent purchases, but most retail is low-intent and social — e-commerce has never exceeded 20% of US retail in ~30 years; live commerce is the first format to combine internet scale with the social, curatorial experience of physical stores .
- Recommended reading: The Hard Thing About Hard Things (the best book about product management), The Purpose-Driven Church (engineering emotional investment — valuable for community products), and Babel .
- Whatnot CPO Tom Verrilli says his product org was built on the premise "we regret that product management exists" — not because PMs are useless, but to force the company to hire PMs only for a specific need, not by default, and to keep engineers' and designers' decision-making "muscles" developed via reps. The org avoids mapping PMs to teams: anyone (engineer or designer) can be a DRI for new product development, all work goes through product review, and PMs are reassigned regularly; every six months CEO/senior leads set company outcomes and assign DRIs. Whatnot has ~21-22 PMs across buyer, seller, and trust/risk groups despite large GMV.
- Hiring: in the last two years 31,832 people applied to be a PM at Whatnot and one was hired. Candidates who dwell on alignment and stakeholder management are trending down — "their specialty wasn't technical... it was politics." Trending up: macro and micro thinking, systems thinking, specificity about what they built, and decision-making. Every role at Whatnot requires a hands-on case study and verbal defense of a POV; candidates good at "theater" but not specifics fall apart quickly.
- Verrilli is excited about PMs moving from org management back to IC work. On his team, PM managers spend 90%+ of their time on IC work and he spends ~50% of his own; this lets senior PMs make faster decisions, span multiple problem areas, and reduce alignment politics — at Twitch he merged ads and discovery under one PM to end the war for impressions and "cut out months and months of back and forth." He argues fewer, more senior IC PMs can earn VP-level comp.
- "IC work" for a senior PM means being in support tickets, pulling your own data, sitting with engineering/design, querying the codebase, writing specs, and running standups — not primarily shipping production code, which he doesn't think is the best use of PM leverage. For PMs struggling in the job market, his advice is to start doing IC work in the role they're in to keep scoping and problem-definition muscles sharp.
- AI's biggest unlocks for his team: (1) self-serve data science — with tools like Hex, PMs can pull nuanced cohort, sensitivity, and regression analyses, so he spends ~10x more time in data and less with data scientists than ever; (2) querying the codebase through AI to understand LOEs and logic without interrupting engineers; (3) real-time feedback loops — watching a live user while analyzing the codebase to distinguish bugs from comprehension gaps.
- Systems thinking is trainable: in product reviews he asks "what do we do if it's green? what do we do if it's red?" and suggests mental exercises like "what would happen if we had a thousand times more usage" to preempt scale failures; internally the motto is "know then go" — think through everything that could go wrong, then make the move anyway.
- Most durable PM skills: identifying what to build, distilling and communicating requirements, prioritizing for the highest ROI, giving design feedback, and go-to-market/business strategy — increasingly valuable across roles as AI lowers building costs. Verrilli agrees but warns many PMs were rewarded for storytelling, alignment, and strategy communication instead of these core skills; he calls the gap "product theater" and says there's "not a lot of place to hide in that anymore."
- Data science implications: PMs doing self-serve analysis means data scientists increasingly review "half-assed data science work" from non-data scientists; the root issue is historical underinvestment in data engineering, tracking, labeling, and attribution. Expect fewer data scientists per unit of customer impact (companies may still hire more as they grow faster), and more "engineering manager light" hybrid tech-lead roles running small incubator teams that take swings at hard problems.
- Future product orgs: specialist PM/design/engineering teams will remain for high-conviction, must-solve projects, but expect "a lot more free space" where any designer, engineer, PM, or data scientist with customer and codebase context can make improvements without a dedicated PM.
- Leadership model: "hire great people and get out of their way" is wrong — his team lives in "verify then trust." Leaders must stay T-shaped and go deep alongside ICs to make good macro decisions; Whatnot's founder CEO will clear his day to dig through tickets, code, and data line by line with a team, setting a truth-seeking culture. Top-down works only when leadership knows ground truth; micromanagement is what happens when you manage from above without it.
- Working with founder CEOs: at founder-led companies the CPO shouldn't compete with the founder on vision; if a founder already owns a topic, check they're accountable and step out. Pushback should start from curiosity, ask whether the decision is made or open, bring data when you have it, and accept that when it's two opinions and no data, the CEO's opinion wins.
- "Play the accordion" planning model: constantly zoom out to re-evaluate understanding and strategy, then zoom in to ship the next increment; avoid both pure iteration ("spaghetti at a wall") and long roadmap docs, because A/B learning is tech's comparative advantage. Example from live commerce: skipping structured listings is a local win (sellers hold items up instead of spending ~3.5 minutes per listing), but zooming out shows new buyers can't search/discover unlisted items; and forcing listings would cut sellers' items per hour — so each level of scale reopens the trade-off.
- On agentic commerce: he welcomes agents for programmatic and high-intent purchases, but most US retail is low-intent browsing where curation and social experience matter; e-commerce still hasn't exceeded ~20% of US retail after ~30 years. Live commerce is not a competitor to agentic commerce but a different customer need: it combines internet scale with the physical-store social experience, and streams with 30-50 viewers are economically viable because commerce economics differ from CPM-based entertainment.
- Twitter lessons: product-market fit is felt as emotional attachment, not graphs, and survives organizational dysfunction ("if you manage to bottle lightning, doesn't matter how badly you screw up the organization"); and "most of the time when you hear it's really complex, it isn't — leadership is just weak." Everyone knew the 140-character limit had to lift — Japanese users tweeted 6x more because kanji packs more meaning — yet it still took ~1.5-2 years after he left to ship; network effects were what kept Twitter alive.
- Failure lesson: the goal is "batting .500." A recurring trap is trusting averages: a feature used by only 3% of users can be 100% of a specific group's use case, and deprecating it can destroy that group's business; "averages... lie to you all the time," so look at the individual use cases underneath.
Paweł Huryn benchmarked GPT-5.6 Luna after OpenAI cut its price by 80% on July 30, and reports it makes serious agentic AI work viable on the $20/mo ChatGPT Plus plan . For new 1M models, Anthropic no longer supports disabling the 1M context window or overriding auto-compact thresholds, raising cache costs in autonomous loops . On Bug Hunt Bench V7 (105 hidden bugs, two real repos, 10 frontier models), Luna at max reasoning fixed 33 bugs for $1.80/run versus Anthropic Fable 5's 29 fixes at $104 and GPT-5.6 Sol's leading 42 fixes at $69.61; Luna at high effort fixed only 13, so reasoning effort is the decisive variable . Opus 5 and Luna rate cards sit 20-25x apart (input $5.00 vs $0.20/M tokens; cached $0.50 vs $0.02; output $25.00 vs $1.20), with measured spreads of 20-90x by config and session length . Conclusion: "You will get more real work out of the $20 OpenAI plan & Luna max than out of the $200 Claude plan & Opus high" . Luna max is slower than Opus 5 high, so the suggested split is Luna max for planning, strategy, large implementations, and async work; Luna high for batch operations, bug fixes, small features, and summaries — still better than Sonnet 5 high . Median per-question costs at max effort were 0.11 cents cold / 0.06 cents in-session for Luna vs ~10.1 cents cold / ~2.5-2.8 cents in-session for Opus 5, closing the gap from ~90x to ~40x on small questions; fast mode billed 2x/2.5x with no measurable benefit for Luna . Verified available on a second Plus subscription; all runs and logs are public with answer keys withheld .
Setup playbook: the Codex app is now the ChatGPT desktop app and supports autonomous loops, /goal graphs, agentic coding, project skills and MCP, and manual compaction with no IDE/CLI . Install from chatgpt.com/download; Plus ($20/mo) is enough . Choose ChatGPT mode for knowledge work or Codex mode for coding/prototyping, which adds a file tree and visual diffs . Set reasoning effort to max — off by default, and max is a different model . For Claude users, create AGENTS.md at the repo root pointing to CLAUDE.md so both agents share one source of truth . Author's routing: Fable 5 for judgment/strategy/complex cases; Opus 5 for frontend and writing; Grok 4.5 for real-time info; Grok 4.5 + Opus in parallel for research; Sol high / Luna max / Grok 4.5 for coding and debugging; the most expensive model never touches code .
On quality: 53 of the 105 benchmark bugs survived every model and run, yet the author argues models beat humans at finding bugs — "human code review no longer makes sense" — and humans should shift to reviewing artifacts (what changed, why, whether to ship) plus visual testing; his extension's 1,600+ AI-written unit tests still required his eyes for visual defects . Supporting signal: Google fixed 1,072 Chrome security bugs in Chrome 149/150 — more than the prior 23 releases combined — including a 13-year-old sandbox escape found by an agent .
PMs facing pushback from business leaders on unvalidated work should avoid authority-based appeals: "please trust me, I'm Head of Product" loses trust and can be career-limiting . Instead, treat influence as product's primary job—get better at storytelling and evidence-backed narratives to convince leadership what is feasible and infeasible . Anchor prioritization in a clear vision and roadmap: focus outweighs side quests, and even a hypothesis can be stepped out from a distant vision . Frame asks around stakeholder interests ('WIIFM'—What's In It For Me) ; when stakeholders push unvalidated ideas, surface effort, cost, and impact details and cite case studies for industry-standard features like onboarding walkthroughs . Get buy-in for experiments and priorities by presenting a compelling narrative backed by data—inability to articulate investment rationale is itself a product problem . Validation must span feasibility, customer value, and business viability, and 'keep the lights on' work should be framed in terms of revenue, productivity, savings, or safety .
- Include vibe-coded projects, but frame as product work: PMs advise listing them, presented as “identified a problem, scoped it, shipped it,” labeled “AI-assisted,” and only when you can show users, iterations, and learnings ; a “personal projects” section works since PM hiring rarely expects coding outside seed-stage startups . A FAANG PM calls coding a “box check” — understand how software is built, not code it; easy bar .
- Proof over claims: The job is shifting from “tell me” to “show me”: provide clickable artifacts (GitHub, live apps in Replit/Lovable), a decision log showing progress and failures, and be ready to build in tools like Bolt or Base44 during interviews; show a repeatable method across problems and tools . Only include projects if you can articulate the pain point, approach, tools and why, and outcome; inability loses interest fast; explaining LLM choice earns bonus points .
- Trend and cautions: Vibe-coded projects are increasingly appearing on PM resumes and may become a minimum requirement in tech ; one PM credits them for their last role . Counterpoint: include only if you want to code in your next job . Public projects with downloads/purchases can be listed as a side business rather than job experience .
- A PM case study: A website PM (5 years exp, 4 months into role) found the company lacked a true home page — the main page pushed all content/services with no user journeys or introduction . The pitch used numbers, stats, best practices, OKR ties, and data showing declining revenue/traffic since the current page was adopted . The manager resisted ('what we have works', 'change will just confuse people') and deflected every question . Approval came only after the PM set up a call with multiple senior leaders and let them discuss, leading the manager to concede ; the project then stalled for two months on developer capacity and canceled presentations .
- Advice for persuading resistant leadership: run low-risk experiments first — ask customers what they search for, have social media post that content, track views/shares for ~2 months, then present the data to senior management; a free Google-hosted landing page is an alternative . When risk is low, 'it is better to ask for forgiveness than ask for permission' .
- Use an A/B test to de-risk changes for a risk-averse manager: define success and test the hypothesis, since the manager is accountable for the PM's outcome . Anchor proposals to the outcomes leaders want — ask what outcomes they're achieving and how the change contributes ; back proposals with user feedback and other data . A company without individual OKRs (only company goals) makes this measurement harder .
- Relational lessons: treat the breakthrough as a win and build trust through delivered work to make future asks easier ; alternatives include finding allies, doing the job, or leaving .
In a Reddit PM thread, the question was which metric LinkedIn PMs were optimizing; one proposed framework: primary = incremental Premium subscribers, secondary = median number of top jobs per user and % of users with ≥3 top jobs, guardrail = CTR on job listings .
Another comment argued LinkedIn's real users are paying customers (recruiters, salespeople, job seekers), so inflating job postings can push recruiters to higher price tiers and keep job seekers subscribed longer, since they stop paying once they find a job ; LinkedIn Premium messaging even claims users get 2.1x recruiter replies to drive subscriptions .
PMs debated whether ghost jobs are a product issue: one said it's a mix of product + user behavior and that trying to prevent every edge case wastes engineering time, noting most ghost listings are evergreen reqs, post-internal-hire compliance posts, or stale openings ; another countered that a platform's lack of due diligence/transparency on UGC is a product decision .
A PM career note: short-term 'growth' metrics that damage long-term trust are still attractive because PMs can put them on a resume and job-hop before fallout — driven by being forced to change companies for raises .
The thread also invoked the principle 'Tell me how you measure me, and I will tell you how I will behave' , and another commenter joked the targeted metric was PMs' annual bonus .
- PM roles rarely follow a formal-education route; one commenter says "None of the PMs I know have formal education, including me" , and a sample path runs Navy officer → engineering master's → energy operations → automating own job → internal product suite → fintech .
- Identifying an unmet customer need can get you into PM: a salesperson whose customers asked for a competitor's feature C built it separately after Product said "It can't be done," launched product X V2, grew revenue "A LOT," and was then hired as PM of that product .
- Entry via customer-facing roles works: a PM landed a customer service/implementation job through tech newsletters and local PM meetups, learned customer problems, built a strategy to solve them, and worked up to PM .
- Building internal tools to fix real pain can open the door: a temp HR program manager built an MS Access database and self-taught SharePoint to reduce email/spreadsheet overload, then moved into a tech-writing/SharePoint contractor role and eventually into product .
- One long progression: production floor machine operator → supervisor → IT service analyst → junior PM → PM → IT manager → scrum master → product owner → IT program manager → IT product management director, driven by forming customer-product opinions while working with Agile/engineering teams .
- Counterpoint: a multi-disciplinary (technical, creative, strategic, commercial) poster who thought PM was the "closest fit" ended up "wrong" .
Tom Verrilli (CPO at Whatnot, ex-Twitch/Twitter) joined Lenny Rachitsky's podcast to discuss:\n- How AI is exposing rampant "product theater" \n- Systems thinking as the PM skill trending up fastest \n- AI's biggest unlock for PMs is now in data science, not prototyping \n- Why you should stop promoting A-players out of the work they're great at \n- Why "hire great people and get out of their way" is wrong
Shreyas Doshi argues that product insight, intuition, and taste stem from countless factors, so tips and tactics alone cannot make someone great at product; however, he has observed many people improve substantially after dropping their lifelong need to feel smart and sound intelligent while building . He shared a Claude Chat conversation analyzing why this need gets in the way and why most people never consider dropping it despite decades of struggle, linking to it here: https://claude.ai/share/9ef35347-9a26-449a-ab2e-f737d6188a56.
Thread asks how orgs respond when teams repeatedly miss OKRs/sprint goals and what handling well vs badly looks like . When misses are punished with consequences, the predictable result is that teams commit to less than they can do, hit rates rise, delivery falls, and the only honest forecasting number is destroyed — a team hitting 100% of commitments is sandbagging, not strong . A diagnostic test: count genuinely completed items per week for 10-12 weeks. If the count is stable while commitments are missed, it's a commitment-setting problem (targets demand the team's best week every week), not a delivery problem; if the count is falling or volatile, investigate real root causes like dependencies, unclear requirements, attrition, or tech debt. Most orgs never run this check and apply the wrong response . A better commitment practice: publish confidence ranges instead of single dates — e.g., 'X by the 30th is roughly a coin flip; the date we are 85% confident of is the 14th of next month' — and let the business pick which to plan against . Related tactics: frequent check-ins so issues surface before they're too late ; risk-adjusted roadmaps posted company-wide with receipts (commit revisions) ; in semiconductors, a PM padded sampling schedules with at least one silicon spin and +50% on device qual, posted the Gantt chart, and dev teams didn't push back — 'the best project executions were driven by constant risk management' . On OKRs: some treat them as stretch goals where ~80% of key results is a win and 100% is above expectation; setting targets too low makes them floors. One PM reports seeing four implementations and returns to 'why do we have these objectives' each cycle . Another commenter questions whether OKR frameworks are still followed ('last time I heard OKR was in 2024') . One response says 'nothing' happens, which the commenter considers bad handling .
Hiten Shah asserts that taste is one of the few competitive advantages that gets stronger as AI improves . He recommends Patrick Collison's essay on aesthetics, which argues that Stripe has always aimed to do things well and found that attempting to do them beautifully helps break out of standard practices, achieve greater novelty, and gain other benefits; it also lets excellent people do intrinsically satisfying work without justifying every assessment through torturous empiricism . Collison highlights the reflexivity between supply and demand in markets: supply can shape demand and trap markets in objectively inferior equilibria (e.g., German food being worse than its richer neighbors'), a dynamic product makers should consider when shaping offerings . He also cites Elaine Scarry's idea that beauty inspires creation, implying ugliness inhibits it—supporting the value of aesthetic quality in product development .
Shreyas Doshi: product insight, intuition, and taste are rooted in countless factors, so tips and tactics alone can't make someone great at product; however, he has seen many people improve significantly after dropping their lifelong need to feel smart and sound intelligent while building .
In a PM community thread on data mistakes, practitioners shared cautionary examples: a company officer misinterpreted a funnel by treating higher checkout rates among shoppers who already had items in their cart as a success signal, sending the team on a 'wild goose chase' . Leaders reportedly avoid data because it 'might tell us we're wrong' and follow fads because data feels 'too unreliable' ; optimizing for click-through rate produced clickbait that 'lowered down funnel results massively' . One commenter argues data is never the bottleneck, because the same data is interpreted five different ways by five different C-suites depending on what they optimize for; the real gap is alignment of incentives and a shared context of the end goal .
For sizing an e-commerce marketplace opportunity: segment the population by age (0-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80), apply online-shopping penetration rates per segment (30%, 90%, 70%, 30%), and an average monthly spend of $150 to estimate total market size. In the example, Japan's ~120M population yields 66M online shoppers and a $120B annual online shopping market. Then apply the marketplace share of online sales (assumed 10% → $12B) and the company's penetration of that marketplace (assumed 10%, based on success in other Asian markets) → $1.2B revenue opportunity, a ~10% increase over the company's current $13B.
On r/ProductManagement, a reply to a career-fit question characterizes navigating corporate politics, managing stakeholders, and getting micromanaged by executives as 65% of a PM's job, and suggests the questioner is better suited to product ownership; the advice is to first work in adjacent, regular business roles to earn domain experience . The thread's author is a 19-year-old starting an IT consulting degree apprenticeship who enjoys creative, people-facing work and improving product features but is stressed by office politics and micromanagement .
Career transitions out of gaming PM are possible and there is practical advice. One PM with 10 years in mobile gaming wants to leave for a less volatile industry with a higher earning ceiling, worried about domain lock-in . Commenters report successful exits: a friend moved from gaming PM to PM in Energy then program manager in insurance ; another PM who worked on an AAA title has since switched industries twice ; and several have gone into higher ed, though company choice matters . Positioning advice: gaming PMs are typically business-oriented, outcome-driven, and accountable, so emphasize quantified roadmap results (e.g., improved day-30 retention, engagement, freemium upsell) when applying; prefer B2C roles over B2B, which is a different challenge .
- IP-based AR location games remain a high-risk category: follow-ups such as Harry Potter: Wizards Unite, Minecraft Earth, Pikmin Bloom, Monster Hunter Now, and Jurassic World Alive flopped (Pikmin Bloom's flop status disputed) .
- Pokémon Go's success is attributed to generational IP and a uniquely broad fan base rather than game quality (“There is no game, it’s just a tracking app with Pokémon”), a combination commenters believe is not repeatable .
- A hidden purpose of Pokémon Go was data collection: in-app AR scans were aggregated into a global visual positioning system later sold as Niantic Spatial's flagship product for drone navigation without GPS; this may make users jaded about similar apps .
- Monetization remains an unsolved trade-off: “These ideas don't lend themselves to monetization very well. You basically have to ruin the thing to make it profitable” . Still, Pokémon Go generates ~$1B USD yearly profit since Scopely acquired it in 2024 .
- AR technology has matured since 2016, potentially reopening the window for a new concept . A proposed concept: a real-world quest app for self-improvement where users physically complete quests (recordings, check-ins, health data) to earn in-app currency redeemable for real-world rewards via local partnerships; key risks include reward economics, fraud prevention, and local network effects .
A PM at a big fintech company describes the past 4 years as "somewhat a nightmare": constant re-orgs every 6 months made it impossible to create a roadmap, validate prioritization of problems, or track performance metrics, and a PIP culture is burning them out . They no longer have a core tech team and must fight for resourcing; if their platform is not "sexy or important," they cannot deliver and risk being piped out . The company also has no BAs to validate whether the problems being solved are the right ones . The PM asks whether this experience is representative of being a PM in general .
Framework: marginal cost of the next unit of supply — not user count — determines whether a product/business is a studio or platform. Flat line (unit 10 costs the same as unit 1) = studio: growth linear in headcount, margins capped by labor; descending curve (unit 10 costs meaningfully less because unit 1 built something reusable) = platform: each unit shipped makes the next cheaper, and the reusable asset eventually becomes worth more than the units. Applies across categories: monument (location-based AR), city (marketplace), enterprise onboarding (services SaaS), SKU (hardware). Most founders in flat-line businesses believe they are in curve businesses; the tell is being unable to state what the last unit cost versus the first — if that number can't be produced in under a minute, there is no curve.
Practical steps to bend the curve: (1) stop researching, start compiling — check whether the expensive "original" work already exists in public archives; (2) build the library, not the artifact — assume half of any first version becomes a reusable component, even though it costs more the first time; (3) kill any step a human does twice — start with repetitive steps, not hard ones. In practice, one expensive input (per-site historical research) collapsed between unit 1 and unit 2 when survey plans and photographs were found already catalogued in an archive.
Caveat: forcing the curve too early is a trap — building the reusable library on unit 2 before knowing whether units 5–10 look alike creates an abstraction that fits nothing; assess whether you have enough units to know what is actually reusable. The author, with only two units (the second unfinished), deliberately abstracts the process (capture, sourcing, verification) rather than the artifact, since each monument has a different destruction history.
This CPO regrets that product management exists | Tom Verrilli (CPO of Whatnot)
Whatnot’s anti-ratio PM philosophy — Tom Verilli, CPO of Whatnot (ex-Twitch CPO)
- Whatnot’s product org was built on the premise “We regret that product management exists” . The intent: don’t hire a PM just for the sake of hiring one — hire where there’s a specific need , and don’t assume a PM is needed in every place . PM is “a trade, not a qualification,” a muscle built by reps; the more PMs abstract engineers and designers from product decisions, the more those muscles underdevelop .
- The pattern he attacks: the “HR ratio” of pods — every six engineers gets a designer, a PM, an EM — which produced PMs where none are needed (e.g., notifications infrastructure) and “infantilizes” engineers/designers who are perfectly capable of making good decisions .
- Implementation at Whatnot: PMs are mapped to problems and core projects, not teams — an engineering team can go a year without a PM while product work continues; the org’s docs are explicit that a DRI for new product development can be an engineer or a designer, but everyone goes through the same product-review rigor .
- Org shape: ~21–22 PMs loosely grouped into buyer, seller, and trust-and-risk; PMs get reallocated often. Every six months the CEO, CPO, and senior leads define what needs to be true, go through the list, assign a DRI per critical project, and grab a PM when a high-priority item has no owner — overwhelmingly the DRIs end up being PMs .
Hiring: what’s changing
- Whatnot got 31,832 PM applicants in two years and hired one .
- Trending down in interviews: candidates who lead with driving alignment, stakeholder management, and relationships — a cohort whose specialty was “politics,” not technical or customer insight .
- Trending up: showing both macro and micro thinking — describing the end state while being visibly impatient to validate it quickly — and being specific about things you personally built and decided, not products you “babysat” at a scale company .
- Every hire at Whatnot, in any role, does a hands-on case study; candidates who present beautifully often decay when forced to verbally defend a POV on a prompt plus data — a screen for “product theater” .
- Building systems thinking: in reviews always ask “what do we do if it’s green? what if red?”; mentally play out 1000x usage and knock-on effects; internal motto “know then go” — think through all the risks and where scale breaks, then move anyway .
- Advice to PMs in the shifted job market: start doing IC work in your current role and push internally for practical work; rebuild the muscles of scoping the right thing, understanding the problem, and defining what good looks like .
The shift back to IC work
- Previously the ladder promoted your A players into directors and out of doing things; at Whatnot the ~4–5 PM managers spend 90%+ of their time on IC work and Verilli spends ~50% — “why wouldn’t you want Messi playing for your team rather than the academy coming along all the time?” .
- IC work for senior PMs = sitting in support tickets, pulling data yourself, sitting with engineering and design, querying the codebase, writing specs, running standups. Verilli has shipped production code himself but doesn’t think it’s the best use of his time .
- Why it works: senior ICs make faster, more intuitive decisions and see more of the business — one VP can cover what stacked junior PM layers would — and fewer layers cut alignment politics. Concrete example: at Twitch, discovery and ads teams were “always at war for impressions”; one PM accountable for both organically aligned the trade-off (feed GMV via organic vs. paid) and cut months of back-and-forth .
- Comp logic: total the comp of five L5s + four L7s + a VP, and you could instead pay three ICs director/VP-level money given their impact .
- He recruits senior folks sick of alignment meetings (“don’t you miss actually doing things?”) and expects a bifurcation — some orgs are large enough that IC-everywhere isn’t right .
Leadership, coaching, and founder-CPO dynamics
- “Hire great people and get out of their way” is wrong; the model is “verify then trust.” Leaders must go deep with teams periodically — founder CEO Grant clears his day to pull up tickets, code, and data line by line — because “you can’t make good macro decisions without the micro”; Verilli aims to be T-shaped (broad, deep when required) .
- Top-down leadership works well when leadership is good enough to be in the weeds and specifically correct; “micromanagement” is managing from above without ground truth. Junior ICs are stoked to work alongside the CEO/CPO because they’re simply unblocked .
- CPO–founder operating rules: if a founder is already on something, step out rather than create the team’s “two dads problem”; before joining, calibrate (Verilli did 5–6 coffees plus a full day jamming on real problems with the founders); the job is translating the founder’s vision into reality, not competing for it .
- Pushing back on the CEO: start from curiosity — “am I hearing you right that this is your prior? is there context I don’t have?” — then ask if their mind is made up; if it’s two opinions and nobody has data, “the CEO’s opinion is going to win,” so check your ego or go get data .
- Coaching: stop the “review yo-yo” — a junior PM bouncing the same PRD through review after review; instead help people understand what good looks like relatively quickly and keep moving .
Frameworks and hard-won lessons
- “Play the accordion”: stretch out to define what you’re trying to get done, compress by shipping V1, then stretch again with what you just learned. Value is created in the compress (shipping); the stretch alone is not value. Roadmap-only and iteration-only both fail — you need both, constantly zooming out and pushing back in .
- Worked example: Whatnot historically didn’t need listings (sellers can hold an item up — zero minutes vs. ~3.5 minutes per listing), but zooming out reveals new buyers will expect search to work; forcing all sellers to make listings would slash how much they can sell per hour. The loop of trade-offs is the point .
- Twitter lessons: real product-market fit is “bottling lightning” — it survives even badly run orgs, and network effects keep the product alive through chaos; and “most of the time you hear ‘it’s really complex,’ it isn’t. Leadership is just weak” — the 140-character limit took endless working groups because nobody would make the call, and shipped ~1.5–2 years after he left with nobody dying .
- A failure pattern to avoid: “averages mean nothing to the individual.” A feature used by only 3% may be 100% of a segment’s core use case; deprecating it can spiral through network effects — and in e-commerce it’s someone’s business. “When you have data and an anecdote, trust the anecdote” (Bezos) .
AI and the future of the PM role
- AI isn’t the root cause of the fewer-PMs model but makes it viable: “you can have one very senior PM across more things and they can be more efficient than having three relatively entry-level PMs” .
- Top AI leverage for PMs: (1) self-serve data science on tools like Hex — nuanced cohort reports, sensitivity models, forecasts — Verilli now spends ~10x more time in data and far less with data scientists; (2) querying the codebase through Claude instead of polling engineers for how systems work; (3) real-time feedback loops — watching a customer struggle live while analyzing the codebase to distinguish a bug from a comprehension gap .
- PM skills are the most durable — genuinely understanding the customer, business, and tech and translating across them — but many titled PMs spent the last five years getting good at storytelling, alignment, and frameworks, i.e., Marty Cagan’s “product theater,” and “there’s not a lot of place to hide in that anymore” .
- Ripple effects on other roles: data scientists shift toward fixing tracking/attribution and data labeling (orgs historically underinvested there) and reviewing others’ half-baked self-serve analysis ; trending up is an “engineering manager light” — a hybrid tech-lead/EM running a small incubated team to take swings at problems once considered too hard . Fewer people per unit of output needn’t mean net fewer roles if the company grows faster .
- Future team shape: specialist designer/engineer/PM teams remain for high-conviction projects, while at the edges anyone well-versed in customer problems and the codebase — designer, engineer, PM, or data scientist — gets more free space to go fix things .
- Strategic view: agents will take over programmatic and high-intent purchases, but most retail is low-intent and social — e-commerce has never exceeded 20% of US retail in ~30 years; live commerce is the first format to combine internet scale with the social, curatorial experience of physical stores .
- Recommended reading: The Hard Thing About Hard Things (the best book about product management), The Purpose-Driven Church (engineering emotional investment — valuable for community products), and Babel .
- Whatnot CPO Tom Verrilli says his product org was built on the premise "we regret that product management exists" — not because PMs are useless, but to force the company to hire PMs only for a specific need, not by default, and to keep engineers' and designers' decision-making "muscles" developed via reps. The org avoids mapping PMs to teams: anyone (engineer or designer) can be a DRI for new product development, all work goes through product review, and PMs are reassigned regularly; every six months CEO/senior leads set company outcomes and assign DRIs. Whatnot has ~21-22 PMs across buyer, seller, and trust/risk groups despite large GMV.
- Hiring: in the last two years 31,832 people applied to be a PM at Whatnot and one was hired. Candidates who dwell on alignment and stakeholder management are trending down — "their specialty wasn't technical... it was politics." Trending up: macro and micro thinking, systems thinking, specificity about what they built, and decision-making. Every role at Whatnot requires a hands-on case study and verbal defense of a POV; candidates good at "theater" but not specifics fall apart quickly.
- Verrilli is excited about PMs moving from org management back to IC work. On his team, PM managers spend 90%+ of their time on IC work and he spends ~50% of his own; this lets senior PMs make faster decisions, span multiple problem areas, and reduce alignment politics — at Twitch he merged ads and discovery under one PM to end the war for impressions and "cut out months and months of back and forth." He argues fewer, more senior IC PMs can earn VP-level comp.
- "IC work" for a senior PM means being in support tickets, pulling your own data, sitting with engineering/design, querying the codebase, writing specs, and running standups — not primarily shipping production code, which he doesn't think is the best use of PM leverage. For PMs struggling in the job market, his advice is to start doing IC work in the role they're in to keep scoping and problem-definition muscles sharp.
- AI's biggest unlocks for his team: (1) self-serve data science — with tools like Hex, PMs can pull nuanced cohort, sensitivity, and regression analyses, so he spends ~10x more time in data and less with data scientists than ever; (2) querying the codebase through AI to understand LOEs and logic without interrupting engineers; (3) real-time feedback loops — watching a live user while analyzing the codebase to distinguish bugs from comprehension gaps.
- Systems thinking is trainable: in product reviews he asks "what do we do if it's green? what do we do if it's red?" and suggests mental exercises like "what would happen if we had a thousand times more usage" to preempt scale failures; internally the motto is "know then go" — think through everything that could go wrong, then make the move anyway.
- Most durable PM skills: identifying what to build, distilling and communicating requirements, prioritizing for the highest ROI, giving design feedback, and go-to-market/business strategy — increasingly valuable across roles as AI lowers building costs. Verrilli agrees but warns many PMs were rewarded for storytelling, alignment, and strategy communication instead of these core skills; he calls the gap "product theater" and says there's "not a lot of place to hide in that anymore."
- Data science implications: PMs doing self-serve analysis means data scientists increasingly review "half-assed data science work" from non-data scientists; the root issue is historical underinvestment in data engineering, tracking, labeling, and attribution. Expect fewer data scientists per unit of customer impact (companies may still hire more as they grow faster), and more "engineering manager light" hybrid tech-lead roles running small incubator teams that take swings at hard problems.
- Future product orgs: specialist PM/design/engineering teams will remain for high-conviction, must-solve projects, but expect "a lot more free space" where any designer, engineer, PM, or data scientist with customer and codebase context can make improvements without a dedicated PM.
- Leadership model: "hire great people and get out of their way" is wrong — his team lives in "verify then trust." Leaders must stay T-shaped and go deep alongside ICs to make good macro decisions; Whatnot's founder CEO will clear his day to dig through tickets, code, and data line by line with a team, setting a truth-seeking culture. Top-down works only when leadership knows ground truth; micromanagement is what happens when you manage from above without it.
- Working with founder CEOs: at founder-led companies the CPO shouldn't compete with the founder on vision; if a founder already owns a topic, check they're accountable and step out. Pushback should start from curiosity, ask whether the decision is made or open, bring data when you have it, and accept that when it's two opinions and no data, the CEO's opinion wins.
- "Play the accordion" planning model: constantly zoom out to re-evaluate understanding and strategy, then zoom in to ship the next increment; avoid both pure iteration ("spaghetti at a wall") and long roadmap docs, because A/B learning is tech's comparative advantage. Example from live commerce: skipping structured listings is a local win (sellers hold items up instead of spending ~3.5 minutes per listing), but zooming out shows new buyers can't search/discover unlisted items; and forcing listings would cut sellers' items per hour — so each level of scale reopens the trade-off.
- On agentic commerce: he welcomes agents for programmatic and high-intent purchases, but most US retail is low-intent browsing where curation and social experience matter; e-commerce still hasn't exceeded ~20% of US retail after ~30 years. Live commerce is not a competitor to agentic commerce but a different customer need: it combines internet scale with the physical-store social experience, and streams with 30-50 viewers are economically viable because commerce economics differ from CPM-based entertainment.
- Twitter lessons: product-market fit is felt as emotional attachment, not graphs, and survives organizational dysfunction ("if you manage to bottle lightning, doesn't matter how badly you screw up the organization"); and "most of the time when you hear it's really complex, it isn't — leadership is just weak." Everyone knew the 140-character limit had to lift — Japanese users tweeted 6x more because kanji packs more meaning — yet it still took ~1.5-2 years after he left to ship; network effects were what kept Twitter alive.
- Failure lesson: the goal is "batting .500." A recurring trap is trusting averages: a feature used by only 3% of users can be 100% of a specific group's use case, and deprecating it can destroy that group's business; "averages... lie to you all the time," so look at the individual use cases underneath.